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I 
Introduction 
The thesis focuses on the interaction between default and inflation risk on 
public debt bonds. We lighten the trade-off between flexibility to adverse shocks 
and credibility, in the debt management field, and identify the conditions under 
which the credibility effect can be dominant. 
EMU is now fully operating, including most of the European candidates 
that have been let in under a more relaxed interpretation of the Maasticht Treaty 
criteria. In particular, the debt criterion originally set at 60% of the GDP, was 
reinterpreted to require a debtlGDP ratio declining towards the target. As some of 
the countries have levels of debt above 100% of GDP (Belgium and Italy) and as 
European Central Bank is committed to price stability, what does giving up 
inflation imply for post-EMU debt management? 
A very large public debt, in particular when it is growing faster than the 
GDP, is often associated with two kinds of risk. The first is an inflation risk l : high 
debt countries may be tempted to 'inflate away' part of their debt obligations if 
I Some authors refer to 'devaluation risk'. Inflation and devaluation risks coincide only when the 
purchasing power parity holds. If this is not the case, the inflation risk is the relevant one for 
domestic creditors who see real assets as substitutes for public bonds; while international lenders 
are more concerned with devaluation risk. 
they are not indexed2. The second is the default risk. 'Default' will be used here as 
a general term which indicates anything which may go wrong in the service of 
public debt: outright repudiation; rescheduling or consolidation; or una-tantum 
capital levy. 
Joining the EMU has meant the renounce to monetary sovereignty and thus 
to using inflation as a tool of debt reduction. A possible implication is that this is 
seen as a weakening of the government ability to manage debt service. In this 
case, the disappearing inflation premium will be just transferred into default 
premium. Alternatively, the tightened hands of an inflation prone government may 
have a positive effect on the market expectations. In this case the credibility gain 
may more than offset the loss of the policy instrument, and real interest rate may 
decline. 
Our work provides a contribution in the literature on the divorce between 
fiscal and monetary sovereignty, supporting optimistic forecasts for debt 
sustainability within the EMU area. More sceptical views are not absent in the 
literature, and it has been often stressed that "Because of their huge overhangs, 
European national governments cannot presently afford to give up their money 
issuing authority" (McKinnon, 1996; p. 349)3. The beliefs that EMU would 
increase default probability on public debt, were also on the background of some 
empirical studies4: "that there is some evidence of a default risk even before 
2 For the inflationary consequences of prolonged fiscal deficit see Sargent and Wallace (1981) and 
Drazen and Helpman (1990) among others. 
3 On a similar position is also Goodhart (1997). 
4 For empirical evidence on default risk in some European countries see, for example, Cottarelli 
and Mecagni (1990), Alesina et al. (1992) and Favero Giavazzi and Spaventa (1997). 
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monetary unification strongly suggests that such perceived risk will increase after 
full integration" (Alesina et al., 1992, p. 429). 
The argument behind this 'pessimistic' view is that when we lose one 
instrument of debt policy we have to rely on the other(s). That is, without 
inflation, all other things being equal, the government would trigger the default 
option when otherwise could just monetise the debt. However, if we remove the 
ceteris paribus assumption, the argument does no longer follow. The point is that 
the ability to inflate away the real value of debt brings about a cost. Removing 
inflation cuts away this cost and makes debt service more 'handleable'. This is 
particularly true for those countries which suffer for an inflation bias problem, 
whilst we prove that this intuition does not apply to countries with a long 
experience of strict monetary discipline5. 
The aim of the work is to show how the picture may change when a 
situation where both inflation and default are instruments of debt reduction, gives 
way to one where inflation is no longer available. 
One major reason why a 'benevolent' government might decide to default 
on its debt is that default is non-distortionary lump-sum tax, which substitutes for 
various distortionary taxes levied to service the debt6• However, default is often 
5 Consistently with our results, EMU would be good news for Italy but not for Belgium. 
6 "In Italy, in late 1980s, the yearly interest payments on public debt were approximately absorbing 
all the personal income tax revenue (Spaventa, 1988). The Italian government could have stopped 
paying interest on its debt and abolished the personal income tax, in a revenue-neutral fiscal 
manoeuvre! With top marginal tax rates above 50% in Italy, even conservative estimates suggest 
that such a default policy might have led to substantial gains in the form of increased labour supply 
and productivity." (Alesina et aI., 1992; p. 431). 
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associated with very high costs of different nature: (i) reputation cost/ (Grossman 
and van Huyck, 1988; Chari and Kehoe 1990); (ii) redistribution costs (Alesina, 
1988; Eichengreen, 1990); (iii) financial fragility costs (Alesina, 1988; Spaventa, 
1988); (iv) transaction costs (Calvo, 1988). 
Such arguments make outright default very unlikely in developed countries 
in 'nonnal' circumstances. However, highly indebted governments may opt for a 
partial default if rolling over the debt has become too costly. 
The topic of sovereign debt default can be collocated in two streams of 
related literature: one regarding default on foreign debt, the other concerning 
default on domestic debt. The fonner is grown fast after the debt crisis of lower 
developing countries (LDCs) in the early 80s. That episodes showed that 
repudiation of sovereign debt is not just a theoretical concern. Many works have 
analysed the effects of including default among the government policy options. 
The strategic role of default is examined in tenns of costs and incentives making 
use of a game-theoretical framework. The main implication that emerges from this 
kind of literature is that a positive default probability implies credit rationing in 
the international financial market (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981; Kletzer, 1984; 
Cooper and Sachs, 1985; Bulow and Rogoff, 1989). Credit rationing implies a 
twofold effect: on one side it limits the indebtedness growth reducing the 
7 OzIer (1993) provides some empirical evidence to support this point. 
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government's incentive to default, on the other constraints the liquidity available 
to a sovereign debtor worsening its ability to meet its debts. 
The interest on the possibility of default on domestic debt is more recent. 
The existing models that deal with the topic, focus mainly on the role of the 
expectations and often exhibit multiple equilibria. The main difference that 
characterises domestic debt management with respect to the foreign one is the 
possibility to inflate away part of the real value of bonds. So, inflation has been 
sometimes seen as a form of implicit default on public debt. 
The main implications that arise from the theoretical contributions are that 
a longer debt maturity and a uniform distribution of debt coming due in each 
period reduce the risk of a debt crisis (Alesina, Prati and Tabellini, 1990; Giavazzi 
and Pagano, 1990). Bond indexation is prooved to be a solution against easy debt 
monetisation (Calvo 1988), but high degree of indexation may also increase the 
default risk (Drudi and Giordano, 1997). 
This theoretical literature has been followed by some empirical 
investigations on the presence of a positive default premium incorporated in the 
government yields of European countries. The empirical evidence suggests the 
presence of a significant risk premium for Italy, and to less extent for Spain and 
Belgium (Alesina et.al, 1992; Favero, Giavazzi and Spaventa, 1997). 
The above mentioned papers have examined the effects of a default risk as 
well as of an inflation risk separately. At the time being, a joint analysis of both 
kinds of risks has received little investigation. The paper by Drudi and Giordano 
(1997) represents in this respect an isolated example. The authors focus on the 
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optimal debt maturity structure and on the term structure of interest rates, when 
both risks push up nominal returns on debt. 
The joint consideration of the two instruments of debt reduction becomes 
important to analyse the effects on public debt management and its sustainability 
within EMU. To this aim we are going to present an analytical framework which 
allows to compare a situation where both default and inflation are available to the 
government to one where inflation is no longer allowed. 
We first introduce a simple model where default is the only alternative to 
fiscal pressure to finance the budget constraint. The decisional process of the 
government is explicitly analysed and the decision to default on part of the 
outstanding debt is conditional on the realisation of a random shock on the foreign 
interest rate. 
The main feature of the model is the 'state dependent' nature of the 
optimal policy chosen by the government, which can decide to exercise the option 
to defaulting on part of its obligations in the bad states of the world. Private 
sector's expectations play a decisive role: taking into account the default 
probability they exacerbate the government's problem; moreover they affect the 
optimal economic policy and can generate multiple equilibria. 
The model is then extended to include inflation as well as default as a tool 
of debt reduction. The comparison of the two models allows us to evaluate how 
EMU will affect default probability. 
The following step is to allow the government to issue short and long term 
bonds. Introducing bonds with different maturities permit to investigate further on 
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the robustness of our results, as well as to draw some implications for the debt 
management policy within and without EMU. 
Finally in the last chapter we take an empirical approach and move to test 
the main assumption of our theoretical framework. In particular we will analyse 
the empirical relationship that links the default premia to the interest rate of a 
foreign country which acts as a leader. In our case, the role of the leader is played 
by Germany. Our results suggest the existence of a non-linear relationship 
between the risk premium on lO-years government bonds in Italy Spain and 
Belgium, and the German interest rate. 
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Chapter 1 
A Brief Survey on Sovereign Debt Default 
1.1 Introduction 
Literature on sovereign debt default is marked by two major events of the 
economic history: the financial crack of the '30s and the debt crisis of the low 
developing countries (LDC) in the' 80s. 
Up to the 'Great Depression' which involved the worldwide financial 
system, default episodes on sovereign debt were not unusual and were part of the 
regular transactions in the international financial market: "Creditors received 
substantial risk premia on foreign loans to compensate for default or sovereign 
risk, and the governments of creditors were typically content to allow their 
nationals to suffer defaults without significant public intervention on their behalf' 
(Sachs, 1982, p. 199). 
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However in the "20s and '30s the f:nancial crisis involved quite severely a 
wide number of countries I. This affected the attitude of sovereign governments as 
well as of investors in facing the risk of debt default. Large investors felt more and 
more uncomfortable in lending to foreign governments and international capital 
remained scarce for the next 40 years. 
International landing grown again in the second half of the '70s, just after 
the first oil shock in 1973. Major banks were investing huge flows of money 
coming from the OPEC countries and found profitable opportunities in the high 
yields offered in developing countries. But next decade, following both the slow 
down of the capital flows from oil exporting countries and mainly the sudden rise 
in the US interest rates, the scenario turned bad again. 
The LDCs had accumulated large foreign debts and faced increasing 
difficulties to meet their regular payments to creditors. In 1982, the Mexican 
suspension of its debt service gave way to the deep crisis that involved the 
majority of Latin American countries for the following decade. 
It was soon evident the worldwide feature of the debt cnSlS: banks, 
governments and International Institutions converged together trying to limit the 
contagious effects of the bad budget sheet of the LDCs. The tentative solutions 
moved along two lines, on one side they provided incentives to economic reforms 
(through conditional landing) on the other threatened punishments for stopping 
payments. 
I A detailed report of the fmancial difficulties of some European governments in serving their 
debts between the two World Wars can be found in Makinen and Woodward (1990). See also 
Eichengreen and De Cecco in the same volume. 
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The debt crisis of the • 80s generated a huge stream of literature on 
sovereign default. The topic was examined from theoretical and empirical 
prospective with a twofold aim of understanding the causes and identifying the 
most efficient strategies to deal with it. A definitive evaluation of the crisis 
management is not available, and we just try to sum up its guiding lines in the 
following: 
• adoption of cooperative bargaining strategies, involving borrowers and 
lenders, often sponsored by International Institutions such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB); 
• easier access to liquidity to deal with emergency situations, at least in the short 
run2. , 
• reallocation of the 'bargaining power' between debtors and creditors which 
gave a higher punishment ability to the latter. 
The '80s were characterised also by a fast growing of public debts in many 
European countries: '"The policy mix adopted in the 1980s was ... a combination of 
strict monetary policy and the growth of public debt to replace the deficit-
monetization which had been the rule in the previous decade" (De Cecco, Pecchi 
and Piga, 1997, p. xii). 
Debt to GDP ratios reached very high levels (seldom seen in the past, if 
war times are excluded) and became reason of concern for policymakers as well 
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as for scholars. The scenario was getting darker in early '90s as real interest rates 
were rising again and GDP growth rates depressed. Highly indebted countries 
pursued strict budget policy under the pressure of the Mahastrict rules, which had 
put fiscal indicators under control3. The academic reaction was slightly faster and 
in late '80s a few papers suggest the existence of a default risk on public debt even 
for European countries. This stream of literature focuses mainly on debt 
management and on government budget constraint looking at default as an 
alternative tool of debt reduction. 
Theoretical papers on the topic analyse the role of expectations and the 
possibility to observe multiple equilibria. In these models often devaluation is 
considered as a form of default and sometimes the only credible one in an 
industrialised country. However, the risk of an explicit default seems to be taken 
into consideration by financial agents. Some empirical studies provide evidence of 
a small, but significant, default premium in the public yields of some high debt 
countries. 
The present chapter presents a brief and non-exhaustive survey of the main 
theoretical as well as empirical contributions in the literature of sovereign debt. 
2 During the debt crisis, the IMF was acting as a lender of last resort and as an intennediary for 
funds to avoid sovereign bankruptcy. In both cases interventions were conditional on the adoption 
of a programme of economic refonns under the supervision of the IMF itself. 
3 De Cecco, Pecchi and Piga (1997) note that: "Less heavily indebted countries, however, did not 
feel the same constraint. As a result, average European Union debt-to-GDP ratios ... in 1995 
reached the unprecedented post-war rate of 70 per cent, even in spite of the relative virtue 
displayed by the large debtors, like Italy, Belgium and especially Ireland' (De Cecco, Pecchi and 
Piga, 1997, p. xii). 
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In the next section we deal with foreign debt and the focus is on the LDCs 
debt crisis. This stream of literature provides hints on a possible scenario for some 
European countries, which in the last year gave up their monetary sovereignty in 
the name of a Single Currency. Without the ability to print money, in fact, 
domestic debt acquires many features in common with debt issued in foreign 
currency (Goodhart, 1996; Folkerts-Landau, Mathieson and Schinasi, 1997). 
In section 1.3 the focus on domestic debt that is more relevant for the 
European countries in the pr:e-EMU phase and for the out-countries4• Moreover, 
we believe that this case is still relevant for the post-EMU phase, as the single 
currency, in which debts of different EMU countries are denominated, is still 
under control of an Institution acting within the area. In short, the country specific 
debts issued in Euro will probably share features of both foreign and domestic 
pre-EMU debts. The section considers three possible scenarios: first, we look at a 
government which can violate the terms of debt contracts (explicit default) with 
private agents; second, we consider the possibility of inflate away part of the debt 
value (implicit default); then, both forms of default will be considered as 
alternative instruments of debt reduction. 
Finally, in the last section, the empirical evidence of a default premium for 
European countries is discussed. 
4 Accordingly to the literature on EMU with out countries we indicate the European countries 
which have opted for stay out of the EMU as well as those which had no option to get in (either 
because they did not satisfy the criteria or because they were not EU members) (De Grauwe, 1997) 
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1.2 Default on Foreign Debt: the Experience from LDCs 
1.2.1 Default and the theory of international lending 
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, in the '70s (after a long 
period that might be called of 'financial autarky') large capital flows were 
channelled from oil exporting countries to the major western banks and from there 
towards most developing countries. The incoming flows were very welcomed by 
the governments of the LDCs, which accumulated growing levels of debts. The 
easy provision of international liquidity together with an excessive confidence in 
the stability of interest rates, led the governments to underestimate the risk of such 
a high indebtedness. Moreover, either due to the political instability or to the lack 
of specific expertise, borrowing funds were seldom profitably invested and the 
economic activity was not significantly improved. It followed that soon as the 
international environment changed at the beginning of the new decade, many 
countries were hardly serving their debts. 
The vast default literature of the 1980s put a great deal in finding a 
satisfactory answer to the following question: why should rational agents lend to 
foreign sovereign governments not subject to any bankruptcy law? Thus, the focus 
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of the analysis is often more on the deterrents for a government to opt for a debt 
default than on its determinants. It emerges a theory of default based on 
repudiation costs. 
The papers discussed in this section present some common features, which 
can be easily summed up in four main points: 
a) necessary condition to observe lending flows to sovereign States is the ability 
of creditors to impose some sort of punishment in case of default; 
b) international lending is characterised by rationing: it does exist an upper 
bound above which the country wants to repudiate debts, thus the creditors 
will never lend in excess to that bound; 
c) the borrowing upper bound is an increasing function of punishment; 
d) without uncertainty the only possible outcome is full debt payment and no 
punishment, equilibria with positive default probability emerge only when 
uncertainty is considered. 
The paper of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) can be considered the seminal 
paper in the default literature on sovereign debt default. The work completes 
research on default and bankruptcy issues previously devoted mainly to corporate 
debt. The authors describe a government that refrains from defaulting on its 
foreign obligations in order to keep easy access to the international financial 
market in the future. The approach adopted is that of the permanent income when 
the economy is subject to good an bad harvests, alternatively. Adopting a 
decreasing marginal utility function the expected actual value of domestic 
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consumption is maximised when government borrows in the bad states and pays 
back the loans in the good ones. With no punishment ability by creditors, the 
government has an incentive to repudiate the debts in the fruitful years, as this 
would increase consumption at zero cost. Therefore, the assumption is that a 
defaulting government is relegated to financial autarky, as foreign investors are no 
longer willing to lend it funds. In a model where smoothing consumption is the 
final aim for borrowing, the access to foreign liquidity to support low 
consumption years is the incentive mechanism for a regular debt service. 
However, the authors show that above a given level of debts the costs of 
repayment are higher than the benefits from new loans. When this level is reached 
default will occur with probability 1. Under perfect information, therefore, 
rational agents will never lend above this amount and possibility for credit 
rationing emerges. Actual financial flows to a sovereign State are given by the 
minimum between the total liquidity demand from the borrower and the maximum 
level of indebtedness imposed by lenders. The model implies that the ceiling on 
indebtedness is increasing in income volatility. In fact, raising the scope for 
consumption smoothing increases the benefits from future foreign loans and 
reduces default incentive. Moreover, credit ceiling rises when higher exogenous 
penalties are available: "Gunboats are the borrower's best friends" (Cline, 1995, 
p. 140). 
In its deterministic version with perfect information, the model implies that 
default is a zero probability event. However, Eaton and Gersovitz propose a 
stochastic framework where uncertainty introduces new implications. In 
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particular, when income path is random, a sequence of bad harvests can make debt 
service very onerous and default more attractive. This makes a point for equilibria 
with positive probability of debt repudiation. When this is the case a high income 
variance can increase rather then reduce the credit ceiling to the country. 
Considering the case of asymmetric information, Kletzer (1984) enriches 
the previous analysis and investigates the properties of competitive equilibria in 
financial contracts between international investors and LDCs governments. The 
author extends the model under different hypotheses on the agents' information 
set. First of all, it is assumed that creditors observe their own lending flows to 
borrowers but not the total level of indebtedness of each country; later, full 
information on country's total borrowing is allowed. In the former case, financial 
intermediates can not discriminate between countries with different levels of 
outstanding debt and since, ceteris paribus, default risk grows with the amount of 
indebtedness, they are not able to select most reliable borrowers. If an equilibrium 
with asymmetric information exists, it has to lie on the borrowing demand curve. 
This allows the lenders to use interest rate (assumed unique in the international 
market) to impose credit rationing5. However, such an equilibrium needs not to 
exist. This is the case when the liquidity demand curve of debtors is such that 
there is no contract to guarantee a non-negative profit to creditors. Nevertheless, 
profitable contracts for lenders may still exist and be signed, in fact "non-
5 Similar credit rationing equilibria have been analysed by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) with reference 
to non-sovereign agents. 
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existence of an equilibrium does not imply that disequilibrium lending will not 
occur" (p. 296) 
In the alternative case of full information, the author proves that an 
equilibrium exists under specific assumptions6. In particular, the equilibrium is the 
contract where the debtor's indifferent curve is tangent to the lending supply 
curve. Usually such an equilibrium is characterised by credit rationing. As the 
equilibrium with complete information is a constrained-optimum, it Pareto-
dominates that one with myopic agents. Actually, in the symmetric information 
contract both credit ceiling and interest rate are lower: thus, utility loss from less 
liquidity available is more that offset by the lower borrowing cost. 
Kletzer argues that lack of enforcement and asymmetric information 
between debtors and creditors are a key elements to clear the main differences 
between sovereign States borrowing and domestic corporate debt contracts. He 
shows how shortening of debt maturity structure, predominance of bank over bond 
lending, quantity rationing of credit, and red-lining of the poorest LDCs are more 
likely to emerge in a more uncertain environment such as that one of international 
lending. 
Both papers discussed above rely on the assumption that sovereign debtors 
refrain from repudiate their obligations to avoid exclusion from international 
credit market in the future. In a survey work, Eaton Gersovitz and Stiglitz (1986) 
6 The proof of existence relies on the assumption that the cumulative distribution function of the 
shock is continuous. 
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note that the argument needs an infinite horizon. Assuming a finite horizon 
implies that the incentive to service the debt does not hold in the final period and 
no loan will be granted coming due in that period. By backward induction to the 
initial period, the authors show that financial transactions are not sustainable in 
the model. However, since both sovereign States and financial institutions have 
plausibly infinite life, the autarky regime is a credible threat. The same argument 
is made for explaining why some developing countries may suffer from low 
incoming funds: "Borrowing for capital accumulation or productive investment 
implies that a point will be reached beyond which the debtor will begin making 
transfers to his creditor. Once the marginal product of capital equals the interest 
rate, there will be no further gain to moving capital to the debtor. At this point, 
the debtor will lose nothing by being denied access to credit markets, and will 
refuse to service its debts. And, by backward induction as before, it will never be 
possible to lend with prospects of payment" (p. 491). Cline (1995), however, 
claims that such a theory is not consistent with the large loans allowed for the 
post-war reconstruction. 
Cooper and Sachs (1985) deal with the topic from the point of view of the 
sovereign debtor. In their analysis, the authors identify three different kinds of 
risks which concur to constraint the availability of international funds: solvency 
risk, liquidity risk and repudiation risk. 
a) Solvency risk: when the country is not able to raise reserves III foreign 
currency high enough to pay back the outstanding debts. The possibility of an 
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insolvent debtor at maturity, implies that creditors are not happy to lend in 
excess of the discounted present value of all the future current account 
surpluses. 
b) Liquidity risk: when the country has to rely on foreign lending to meet 
obligations coming due in low income years and international financial market 
is tight. Liquidity risk represents one more constraint to the indebtedness l~vel 
of the government. Any single creditor may be afraid that the others will not 
grant further liquidity to the country and itself deny the necessary loans. 
c) Repudiation risk: when the country, whatever the economic growth 
perspectives it is facing, chooses not to serve its debts "either because current 
repayment is too onerous or because it is holding out for some sort of debt 
relief' (p. 22). As the other two risks, repudiation risk induces further credit 
rationing. 
Unlike the previous paper discussed here, Cooper and Sachs assume that 
creditors can seize part of the debtor activities and get a direct gain equal to yW 
(where W is the total country wealth and y is constant). Moreover, punishment 
includes further sanctions such that total loss to defaulting debtors is given by 8W 
(with 8>y). Net gain to the country from debt repudiation is therefore D-8W 
(where D indicates total indebtedness), while the actual loss for creditors is D(1-
y)7. Whenever total borrowings exceed sanction costs the government has an 
incentive to default on debt. However, the 8-y spread makes room for bargaining 
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between debtor and creditors, and some sort of debt relief can be wealth 
improving for both parts. Any transfer in the interval (yW, eW) from debtor to 
creditors increases their utility with respect to the outright repudiation alternative. 
The transfer, therefore, disincentives them from imposing sanctions, making the 
country better off as well. The actual amount paid by the debtor depends on the 
bargaining power of the agents and determinates their respective degree of rent 
extraction. 
Cohen and Sachs (1986) focus on the links among international lending, 
default risk and economic growth. The paper presents a model where the 
government borrows from the international credit market to support domestic 
growth8. An indebted country would pass throughout two stages: in the former, 
when international liquidity is largely available, the foreign debt to GDP ratio 
rises and GDP growth rate declines; in the latter, GDP growth stays low and 
constant while foreign credit rationing emerges. The authors claim that each LDC 
will sooner or later approach the second stage. Once the country is in the low 
growth stage, the government stops a full service of debt and only a fraction of 
interests, such as to keep the debt to GDP ratio constant, is paid. 
7 On the assumptions claimed by the authors, the exact loss for creditors should be D-yW. Cline 
(I985)'s point is that they implicitly assume D=W, but it does not need to be the general case (in 
fact, the authors themselves suggest that W>D is expected). 
8 The authors do not share Eaton, Gersovitz and Stiglitz (I986)'s argument on the riskness of 
addressing foreign loans to fmance domestic development. Such an issue does not seem to gather 
support by Cooper and Sachs (I985) either, as they suggest to constraint foreign liquidity to 
investment and development programmes in order to reduce the perception of default risk from the 
creditors. 
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The government can also opt for an outright repudiation of the outstanding 
debts. Whenever this occurs, the country bears a twofold punishment: first of all, 
it will be excluded by the international financial market in the future; secondly, it 
will suffer by a loss ofproductivity9. From the debtor point of view the decision to 
default depends on funds availability from creditors in the future. In turns the 
investors decide their credit lines to the country accordingly to their expectations 
on its present and future behaviour. As the model assumes no uncertainty, default 
never actually occurs. Creditors know the government's objective function and 
limit loans at a level such that repudiation option is always dominated by the 
regular debt service. However, default threat influences creditors strategic 
decisions as well as the domestic growth rate of the indebted economy. 
In their contribution to the debate, Bulow and Rogoff (1989a) recall three 
main reasons mostly claimed to support capital flows to sovereign states in the 
international lending literature: a) creditors' ability to seize debtor's activities in 
case of default; b) debtor's willingness to keep a good reputation in the foreign 
financial market; c) creditors' ability to impose sanctions to the international trade 
of defaulting governments. The authors underline that the first argument is 
negligible, whilst the second is too week to assure the regular debt service 
whenever the debtor has access to contingent contracts to insure itself against the 
9 The lower productivity is justified by a loss of efficiency due to possible troubles in the foreign 
trade after default occurred. 
21 
adverse states of the world lO. Instead, their intuition is that "a country is willing to 
make some repayments on its debts in order to enjoy its full gains from trade" (p. 
159). 
The paper introduces the renegotiations problem into the literature on 
international lending. The approach adopted is that of game theory; in particular, 
the authors present a model a' fa Rubinstein with risk neutral agents to analyse the 
bargaining process underlying debt rescheduling agreements. 
Bulow and Rogeff focus on a small open economy, where the government 
maximises its intertemporal expected utility. In the event of unilateral debt 
repudiation, the country bears an embargo on trade, which reduces export 
revenues of a fraction p. In analogy with Cooper and Sachs's paper, it is here 
assumed that creditors can appropriate part of this revenues. In particular, foreign 
lenders can obtain a fraction a5{p of the debtor's trade revenue. 
In the subgame perfect equilibrium of the model, the maximum debtor's 
GDP share that creditors can subtract to the country each year, is given by: 
q = min {(y+8)/(2y+8+r), (P-1)1P, P} 
(1.1 ) 
10 In a different paper of the same year (Bulow and Rogoff, 1989b) the two authors show that the 
reputation incentive to service the debt not to preclude future loans from international investors, is 
not alone sufficient to justify fmancial transfers to LDCs. With the help of a simple arbitrage 
model, describing a small open economy with stochastic income, they prove that indebted 
countries can be better off replacing foreign loans with 'cash-in-advance' type of contracts. The 
paper concludes that fmancial contracts based on reputation can not be a sequential equilibrium. 
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, 
where y is the depreciation rate of the accumulated stock of domestic good, J is 
government's intertemporal preference discount rate, r is the international interest 
rate, P is the relative price of domestic good with respect to the foreign one, f3 is 
defined above. The terms in curling brackets determinate three regions that 
characterise what the authors call "the equilibrium rescheduling agreement" 
(p.l66): 
a) Bargaining region (when (y+J)/(2y+J+r) is minimum): international creditors 
appropriate a fraction (y+J)/(2y+J+r) of the country income (which is equal to 
Py), while the complementary fraction given by (y+r )/(2y+J+r) is still part of 
the country wealth. 11. The respective shares going to the bargaining parts are 
inversely proportional to their degree of impatience in finding an agreement12. 
b) Autarky-constrained region (when (P-l)IP is minimum): in this region, gains 
from trade are quite low (in fact, we have IIP>l-P, and P~l). The country can 
easily afford a trade embargo with a small loss of revenue and the incentive to 
default is high. However, foreign investors will still be better off accepting a 
low transfer from the debtor and letting the country free to trade. Moreover, the 
level of repayment in this equilibrium appears to be very sensible to the world 
price of the domestic good. 
c) Punishment-constrained region (when f3 is minimum): in this last region, 
creditors have a limited ability to damage trade of the defaulting country and 
II Cline (1995) notes that, assuming o>r, the yearly transfer of wealth to the creditors in the 
'bargaining region' is at least as high as one half of the country's GDP. The author, therefore, 
concludes that this one can not be the relevant region. 
23 
the maximum they can get from bargaining is given by the fraction f3 of its total 
Income. 
On the other hand, default risk induces foreign investors to limit financial 
lending to LDCs. The credit ceiling is calculated to be equal to the present 
discounted value of future expected payments, which is given by: 
R = (Pyq)lr 
(1.2) 
Finally, the authors introduce a random shock on the world interest rate. 
This allow them to analyse the effect of uncertainty in the model. A bad shock on 
the interest rate has two opposite effects for the indebted country: on one side, it 
puts the government under pressure to raise increasing resources for the debt 
service, on the other it increases its bargaining power in the rescheduling process. 
In fact, creditors are now more impatient to get same transfers to allocate to more 
profitable investments. 
These results let the authors to conclude that the deep debt crisis of the '80 
is not really due to irrational investors behaviour, but rather by ''just bad fuel(' 
(p.173), i.e. by sudden growth in the international interest rate and worsening of 
the terms of trade. 
12 This is a general result in the Rubinstein bargaining model (see Fudenberg e Tirole, 1991, 
section 4.4). 
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1.3 Default on Domestic Debt: Some Theoretical Contributions 
In the previous section we have reviewed the theoretical literature on the 
international lending to sovereign States that retain the possibility to repudiate 
their debts. We now present a brief survey of the main theoretical papers, which 
explore the default even on the domestic obligations. The main element, which 
makes the management of public debt to depart from that of foreign debt (i.e. 
denominated in a different currency from the country's legal tender) is that the 
government has got a very attractive alternative instrument to reduce the real 
value of debt: inflation. The theoretical literature on public debt management has 
widely investigated the effects of inflation of fiscal and debt policy, and in a few 
cases the authors have considered inflation just as a special, and somehow softer, 
form of default. However, whilst explicit default implies the government to recede 
on the terms of the debt contract (repudiation of debt, deny to pay interests, delay 
in the payments coming due, and so on), inflation in itself allows the policymaker 
to meet the full face value of its obligations at maturity. As debt is usually issued 
in nominal terms, inflation does not involves any breaking of the contract. In what 
follows we will refer to inflation as implicit default. 
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In this section, we first focus on the models that consider the possibility of 
an explicit default as a government instrument of debt reduction; then, we make 
mention of those papers, which are closely related to the former, but consider 
inflation the only credible tool of real debt 'cheating' in the hands of the 
policymaker. Finally, we present a model where both explicit and implicit default 
appear as different instruments of economic policy. 
1.3.1 Public debt repudiation 
The paper by Calvo (1988) can be considered the reference work for all the 
following literature on public debt default. The author presents two versions of a 
model where the government issues bonds that sells to the domestic private sector. 
In the former version, an economy without money is considered, where the 
government can renege on its debt; in the latter, money is introduced and default 
takes the form of inflation. We start here describing the framework with 
repudiation, and will come back to the other later. 
The model outlines a small closed economy lasting for two periods. Public 
bonds are issued in the first period and paid back in the second. As taxes have 
distortionary effects on income, the government finds an incentive to repudiate 
partly its bonds. In order to have an equilibrium with positive debt, the author 
assumes that debt default is costly. The cost is proportional to the amount of debt 
which is repudiated and enters directly the government's budget constraint. There 
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is no uncertainty in the model and it is assumed that private agents are fully 
informed of the government's objective function. Arbitrage condition, thus, 
implies that public bonds yield equals return from capital (i.e., the opportunity 
cost of holding bonds). 
The author emphasises the role of private agents' expectations in 
generating multiple equilibria: in his own words: "expected (partial) debt 
repudiation would tend to be reflected in the interest rate on government bonds 
(increasing it), while the higher the burden of the debt, the higher would be the 
temptation to repudiate it. Thus, it should be possible to generate an equilibrium 
with low interest and low repudiation, coexisting with a high-interest, high-
repudiation equilibrium." (p. 648). 
After observing the interest rate set by the agents, the government chooses 
the optimal policy that maximises consumption under its budget constraint. Given 
the unit cost of default, the policymaker determinates the optimal level of taxation 
and, consequently, the optimal fraction of bonds to be repudiated. Optimal default 
size is an increasing function of the debt yield. The environment of certainty in 
which agents move makes them always aware of whether or not default is 
occurring, and if it does in which degree. This means that default probability is 
either 0 or 1, while default size varies between 0 and 1. 
Calvo determinates a critical threshold for the optimal tax level, above 
which two equilibria arise: one with fully debt repayment, the other with certain 
default on part of its obligations. On the other hand, when optimal taxes are below 
the threshold no positive debt is sustainable in equilibrium. Finally, when taxes 
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are exactly equal to the threshold, equilibrium is unique and all bonds are repaid 
to the agents. 
The author suggests that indeterminacy of equilibria can be solved and 
default avoided if bonds are allocated throughout an auction that set an upper 
bound to the interest rate. In fact, it is shown that the yield ceiling can be chosen 
in a way to eliminate default risk. 
Following Calvo (1988), Alesina, Prati and Tabellini (1990) interpret the 
bad equilibrium as a confident crisis in the financial market like the 'banking 
panic' depicted by Diamond and Dybvig (1983). The authors note that such an 
equilibrium results from a coordination failure of agents taking simultaneous 
portfolio decisions. In their model, instead, confident crisis is originated by a 
coordination failure among agents who take investment decisions in different 
periods of time. The paper analyses a deterministic infinite living economy with 
two kinds of agents: the government and the representative agent. Government 
issues bonds of one year maturity!3 that can not be hold by foreign. Given the 
initial level of indebtedness, the government chooses between two alternative 
strategies: a) to raise taxes to service the debt; b) to renege its obligations. On the 
other hand, private agents can choose between the following: a) to purchase 
domestic bonds relying on regular debt payments in next period; b) to hold foreign 
assets only (confidence crisis). As in the Calvo's paper, taxes are distortionary and 
13 This assumption is then relaxed by the authors. 
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default is costly. However, unlike that model here the default cost is constant and 
is born by the government the first time it misses its debt service l4. 
The fiscal authority allocates its bonds with an auction procedure. The 
sequence of events is as follow: 
a) the government announces the bond price at which it is willing to issue debt 
and the maximum amount of bonds to be offered; 
b) private investors observe the price and set the quantity of bonds to purchase; 
c) the government determinates its optimal policy given by a combination of 
taxes and default size to satisfy its budget constraint and knowing both debt to 
maturity and the amount of newly issued bonds. 
Alternatively, an auction procedure where the government is quantity 
setter and price taker can be estabilished. The 'lump-sum' nature of the default 
cost implies that optimal default size is 1, i.e. when default occurs it involves the 
total outstanding debt. 
In both ways, the auction relies on a time span between the bonds offer 
from the government and the purchasing decision by the agents. This feature is 
relevant to the results obtained in the model. 
The level of the default cost determinates three region for the equilibria of 
the model: a) when the cost is very low, the equilibrium is unique and total default 
happens in the first period; b) when the cost is high enough, equilibrium is still 
unique but default is never optimal and government services its debt in each 
14 Moreover, the default cost affects the government's utility function and not its budget constraint 
(as it does in the Calvo's model), but the authors claim that this would not influence the results of 
the model. 
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period; c) finally, when the cost is in the intermediate region, two equilibria are 
possible, one with full debt service in every period, the other with complete 
default in the first period. 
The next step of the paper is to extend the model to consider bonds with 
different maturity. The implications are more optimistic: it is proved that, under 
the assumption of time independence of the agents' expectations, a confidence 
crisis seems less plausible when either debt is all in long term bonds or the same 
amount of debt comes to maturity every period. 
1.3.2 Inflation as implicit default 
As we mentioned in the prevIOUS paragraph, Calvo (1988) presents a 
second version of his model, where debt is repaid in nominal terms, but not in real 
term, i.e. debt burden is now alleviated using monetisation. The basic framework 
of the model is very close to the one described in the paragraph 1.3.1 above; 
however, the role of money is now explicitly considered. Money supply is 
controlled by the monetary authority that operates in agreement with the 
government, while money demand is fixed in real terms and equal to a constant K. 
Inflation rate is normalised as B=1lI(1 +tr), where tris the inflation rate. 
There are two main differences that make this model to depart from the 
repudiation version: 
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a) the parameter () can now assume negative values, in particular we have -oo<() 
<1' 
- , 
b) the inflation cost now is born by the agents in terms of inflation tax. The 
government's budget constraint, instead, is improved by inflation as it reduces 
real debt burden as well as increases revenues, through signorage. 
The model is first solved under the assumption of perfect credibility of the 
inflationary policy announced by the government. In this case the equilibrium 
inflation (defined the first best inflation) is unique. Later the time inconsistency 
problem of the government is analysed. It is shown that, when the perfect 
credibility assumption is removed, optimal inflation (second best inflation) is a 
growing function of the bonds interest rate. This generates again multiple 
equilibria. The author shows that multiplicity of equilibria is strictly related to the 
existence of the public debt, when no bonds are issued, in fact, the model exhibits 
a unique equilibrium. The equilibrium is still unique when real money demand, 1(, 
is high enough. As money demand is determined by the past inflation pattern 
"multiple solutions may be a bigger problem for countries which have recently 
suffered from high inflation" (p. 656). 
Inflation affects negatively the economic welfare of the country and in the 
second best case, both equilibrium levels of interest rate are higher than that of 
first best. Thus, the equilibria can be Pareto-ranked. 
Calvo concludes with some implications of economIC policy: bonds 
indexation would attenuate government's incentive to use inflation to reduce debt 
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burden and increase its credibility in announcmg the economic pOlicyl5. In 
particular, the author claims that full debt indexation can restore the first best 
equilibrium I 6. An alternative solution, raised in the repudiation version of the 
model, is to impose an upper bound to the public yields. However, while the 
interest rate ceiling eliminates the indeterminacy of the equilibrium, it let the 
unique equilibrium to coincide with the second best lower inflation outcome. The 
intervention to limit the debt return is, therefore, Pareto-dominated by the full 
indexation policy. 
The topic of debt confidence CrIses, IS investigated by Giavazzi and 
Pagano (1990) as well. In their work, the authors focus on the proper bond 
maturity structure rather then the best degree of indexation, to solve the problem 
of inefficient equilibria. 
The main novelty of the paper with respect to the models discussed above, 
is the introduction of a source of uncertainty in the government's preferences, 
which is responsible for asymmetric information between the policymaker and the 
private agents. The main result is that agents' pessimistic expectations do not 
trigger the debt crisis, but just increase the probability of it occurring. The authors 
focus on debt management policy and on its role in affecting the Central Bank 
ability to resist the crisis. 
15 Calvo and Guidotti (1990) study the optimal bond indexation degree with respect to prices and 
the optimal debt maturity structure, to reduce inflation bias. 
16 This result relies on money demand being completely inelastic to the interest rate. 
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The kind of crisis examined in the paper is of one generated by a 
speculative attack against the national currency, when the country is committed to 
a fix rate regime. Debt repudiation is not considered explicitly, but the two authors 
suggest that their framework can be easily extended to a close economy where the 
currency attack is replaced by a debt solvency crisis. More importantly public debt 
management plays a decisive role in the analysis. 
The model describes an open economy where three agents interact: private 
sector, the Treasury and the Central Bank. Private sector sets the probability of 
observing a devaluation of a given size and asks for a risk premium to hold 
domestic bonds. The Treasury chooses the economic policy given by a 
combination of borrowing and monetisation to finance the fiscal deficit. 
Monetisation is implemented by withdrawing money from a special fund at the 
Central Bank. The Treasury pursues two objectives: a) to minimise public debt 
service; b) to help the Central Bank in defending the exchange rate. When the 
private sector is fully confident in the fix rate regime, the Treasury can stabilise 
debt at a constant level with uniform maturity structure. Newly issued bonds 
finance the total deficit and no monetisation is needed. However, when probability 
of devaluation is positive (confidence crisis) the Treasury must decide between 
borrow at a higher rate or withdraw money from the Central Bank, or a 
combination of the two. The level of monetisation depends on the government's 
preferences, which are random in each period. Private agents know the probability 
distribution of such a random variable but can not obserVe its realisation in 
advance. 
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The Central Bank's role is to implement a stable monetary policy with the 
aim to protect the fix parity of the currency. The reserves own by the Central bank 
are enough to defend the parity if the Treasury does not intervene by increasing 
liquidity in the economy. However, the government's incentive to withdraw 
money is taken into account by the private sector that can correctly anticipate the 
probability of devaluation. 
The authors show that an equilibrium with no devaluation does always 
exist. In particular, it is the unique equilibrium when probability of crisis is below 
a given critical value. However, when devaluation expectations are above that 
threshold, more equilibria emerge. 
The policy implications of the model are consistent with those of Alesina, 
Prati and Tabellini (1990). In fact, Giavazzi and Pagano show that if debt maturity 
is long enough, the Central Bank is always able to avoid the crisis. Moreover, the 
probability of devaluation is reduced by a unifor distribution of the maturity 
structure, such that the same amount of bonds is coming due in each period. 
1.3.3 Default and inflation as instruments of debt reduction 
The analysis of debt crisis when both default and inflation are available 
instruments of economic policy has not received a great deal of attention. A model 
which includes the two options will be presented in the next chapter. 
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The issue has been recently analysed in a Discussion Paper of the Bank of 
Italy, by Drudi and Giordano (1997). The interest of an Institution such as the 
Bank of Italy to the topic indicates its relevance for economic policy purposes. 
The two authors focus on the role of the debt maturity structure when both 
default and inflation risks push the domestic interest rate up. The model describes 
the interaction of two kinds of agents (the government, and private investors) in a 
time span of three periods. The investors set the interest rate on short and long 
term bonds incorporating their expectations on future inflation and default. The 
real interest rate in each period is assumed to be stochastic, autocorrelated and not 
affected by the monetary policy of the government17• 
Different instruments of financing the fiscal deficit (with an exogenous 
public expenditure) are available in the three periods: 
Period 0: in the initial period, an exogenous flow of public expenditure is entirely 
financed by govemement's borrowing, through the allocation of short and 
long term bonds to the private sector. Thus, the amount of initial debt is 
given, but the government can optimise on the maturity structure. 
Period 1: in the intermediate period, the fiscal deficit can be covered by: a) 
imposing distortionary income taxation; b) borrowing short term from the 
private market; c) inflating away part of the debt real value; d) defaulting on 
part of the maturing bonds. 
17 In particular, real interest rate is assumed to take just two values, each with probability Vi, and 
with mean o. 
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Period 2: finally in the last period, the government can no longer borrow and has 
to meet its budget constraint raising funds from income tax revenue and 
inflation, and in the bad states of the world by opting for a partial default. 
The model differs from the previous models in introducing a government 
objective function which does not coincide with the representative agent's. The 
government sets its economic policy minimising an intertemporal loss function 
which penalises deviations from the targets 18. Moreover the option for a partial 
default imposes a proportional cost on the social welfare. 
The economy evolves accordingly to the following sequence of events: 
a) real interest rate in period 0 realises and is common knowledge; 
b) given the public expenditure flow, the government chooses the best term 
structure for the debt; 
c) private agents set interest rates on short and long term bonds, accordingly to 
the no-arbitrage condition; 
d) in period 1, the government sets the inflation rate, the income tax rate, the 
amount of new borrowing and decides whether to opt for partial default on 
outstanding short term debt. In case of default, it sets the optimal fraction of 
bonds not repaid. 
The sequence is repeated as: 
e) the new real interest rate (relative to period 1) realises and is observed by the 
whole economy; 
18 The approach followed by the authors is common in the 'time inconsistency' literature (see 
among others, Barro and Gordon, 1983a; Rogoff, 1985) 
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j) short term nominal interest rate is chosen by private investors; 
g) government sets its policy given by a combination of inflation, Income 
taxation and size of default (if any). 
In their analysis, the authors consider different scenarIOS involving 
different degrees of credibility of the government. In particular three cases are 
examined: full credibility, partial credibility and no credibility. 
Full credibility regime: The government is fully credible in committing itself to a 
no-inflation and no-default policy. The equilibrium is in this case 'efficient', 
in the sense that fiscal pressure is uniformly distributed along time. This is 
made possible, irrespective of the uncertainty on the real interest rate, by a 
proper maturity structure of the debt19. Moreover, given the credibility 
assumption, no risk premium is charged and nominal interest rates are equal to 
the real ones. 
Partial credibility regime: The government's policy is assumed credible on the 
regular debt service, but not on the no-monatisation commitment. Backward 
induction solution shows that more uniform distribution of the fiscal pressure 
occurs at the cost of higher inflation in the final period. Numerical simulations 
suggest that the optimal average maturity of debt is inversely related to the 
time path of public expenditure. That is, optimal maturity grows (reduces) for 
time with decreasing (increasing) expenditure. Simulations also indicate that 
19 The authors show that the particular debt structure must be such as to avoid new borrowing in 
the intermediate period. 
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long-short interest rate differential is positively related to the average debt 
maturity. 
No credibility regime: finally if the government cannot commit itself neither on 
default nor on inflation, nominal interest rates incorporate both risks. The 
model then presents two solution: in the former, default never happens, and 
inflation and income tax revenue can finance the fiscal deficit; in the latter, the 
regular debt service gets unsustainable only for the adverse realisation of the 
real interest rate. Anyway default is implemented only in the final period. The 
model illustrates that a positive default risk emerges for high levels of debt, 
but its actual occurring depends on high shock on the real interest rate. 
Moreover, default risk grows when average debt maturity gets shorter. This 
implies that optimal maturity of a non-credible government is longer than that 
of a more reliable one. 
Finally the authors investigate the implications of issuing indexed debt on 
default and inflation risks. The results indicate that with indexed bonds the 
government refrains from using inflation at the cost of a higher default risk. Thus, 
the paper suggest that in a no credibility regime,' the optimal degree of indexation 
should be lower than 100%. 
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1.4 Default on Domestic Debt: Some Empirical Contributions 
In the previous section, we have illustrated some theoretical papers that 
analyse lhe possibility of a debt crisis involving a default risk. The main results 
from the theoretical literature are that default risk is positively correlated with: a) 
high levels of public debt; b) short term maturity of the indebtedness, in particular 
when maturity is not uniformly spread over time. 
Next step is to look at the empirical literature to see if the theoretical 
possibility of observing default on domestic debt finds some evidence in the data. 
In what follows we are going to discuss some studies that investigate whether a 
default risk is perceived by financial investors and thus whether it appears in the 
nominal interest rates. 
The quantitative exerCIse to isolate the default risk from the other 
components of the total risk premium on public bonds IS quite recent. The 
emergIng interest in the topic in late 80s - early 90s is probably the natural 
consequence of the theoretical literature discussed above. But an important factor, 
in delaying this kind of analysis might have been the difficulty to find a proper 
data-set to discriminate the default risk from the other components20. In fact, 
which is the proper proxy to measure the default risk is still an open question and 
20 Other components of the total risk premium are, for example, the devaluation risk and the 
liquidity risk. The fIrst risk concerns the possibility to loose the real value of a given nominal asset 
with respect to a different currency (or the same currency at a different time in case of inflation 
risk). The second regards the difficulty to acquire liquidity if needed before maturity. The latter 
risk is inversely related to the market dimension for that particular asset. 
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different measures have been proposed in the literature. Of course, the 
approximations to the 'true value' have been improving with the availability of 
more data on different financial instruments. 
An interesting analysis involving 12 OEeD countries21 is proposed by 
Alesina et al (1992). The authors present an empirical study of the default risk 
premium based on "the difference between the return from holding government 
debt and the return from holding 'safe' private debt of corresponding maturity, 
denominated in the same currency" (p. 429). How the authors define 'safe' private 
debt, however, is not specified in the paper. Accordingly to expectations, a first 
look at the data (in the time span 1974-89) indicates that the government yields 
are usually lower then the ones paid by the private sector, meaning that public 
debt is perceived on average as safer. However, Italy represents an exception, at 
least in the most recent years of the analysis: in fact, the ratio of return on public 
bonds to that on private is on average slightly higher than 1 in the period 1979-89. 
Interestingly, the authors show that while the variation range of the above 
average ratio is quite small (between 0.89 and 0.98, except for the Italian case), 
the variation range of the ratio (still average on the same period) of public debt to 
GDP is definitely larger (between 0.2 and 0.9). This evidence suggests that if a 
positive relation between returns and level of debt exists, the effect of the fiscal 
variable on the risk premium is relatively small. 
21 The countries included in the study are: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, UK and US. 
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The authors use a panel of data to run regressions of the public to private 
return ratio on the following fiscal variables: 
a) debt to GDP ratio; 
b) annual growth rate of the debt to GDP ratio; 
c) short term debt to total debt ratio; 
among the exogenous variables, it is also considered 
d) the annual growth rate of the industrial production index, to take into account 
the phase of the economic cycle. 
Regressions are also conducted by using the linear spread between public and 
private return in place of their ratio. 
The analysis seems to confirm the theoretical results: the fiscal variables 
are mostly significant and with the correct sign, with the exception of the maturity 
structure that shows a negligible effect on returns22• 
To take into account the potential diversities between countries with 
different fiscal features, the analysis is repeated by dividing the countries in three 
groups: a) countries with sustainable debt pattern (Australia, Canada, France, 
Japan, UK and US); b) countries with very high levels of debt (Belgium, Ireland 
and Italy); c) countries with high debt growth rate (Denmark, Netherlands and 
Spain). The assumption underlying this separation of groups is that default risk 
emerges only when fiscal variables are above some critical level and when they 
follow a time path which is considered not sustainable, in the long run, by 
22 Moreover the coefficient of the variable shows a negative sign, which is not as expected from 
the theory. 
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financial operators. Such hypothesis is, in fact, consistent with the results: debt to 
GDP ratio and its growth rate are significant only for countries in the groups b) 
and c) respectively. While the two fiscal variable do not seem to affect returns in 
the a) group. 
Summing up, the paper by Alesina et al. provides empirical support to the 
following four assumptions: 
a) looking at the OEeD countries, default on public debt is a very low 
probability event: default risk premia, even when significant, appear of very 
small entity; 
b) in particular, significant premIa emerge for very high levels of public 
indebtedness; 
c) default premia are positively correlated with the amount of outstanding debt23 ; 
The main critics to the paper concern the choice to measure default risk 
(Obsfeld, 1992; Rebelo, 1992). The authors themselves, in fact, recognise that 
their proxies are affected by other factors. For example, the returns ratio is 
sensitive to variations in expected inflation, and the differential is affected by 
variation in the tax rate on the two kinds of debt. The authors, therefore, conclude 
their work suggesting some alternative measures to catch the default risk, but all 
of them present shortcuts: 
23 The authors also mention a negative correlation with average maturity of bonds, but give a 
caveat that the evidence is ambiguous. 
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a) Moody's rating of debt bonds. The rating is, however, updated infrequently 
and is based also on factors which may have little to do with debt 
sustainability. 
b) Yield spreads on bonds issued by different countries in the same currency (e.g. 
Eurodollars or ECU bonds). The market of these bonds is not very developed 
and the liquidity risk may be substantial. 
A different method to measure default risk is proposed by Favero, 
Giavazzi and Spaventa (1997). The measure adopted in this paper is given by the 
differential between yields on public bonds and fix rates on swap contracts (in the 
same currency and with same maturity). The advantage of this procedure is that 
swap contracts are fairly liquid, involve all the relevant maturities and have a daily 
quotation on the market. 
The focus of the paper is to investigate on the causes of the spreads 
between the public debt returns in high yield countries (Italy, Spain and Sweden) 
and in Germany. The authors note that the differentials with respect to German 
rates do not show a stable relation with the respective inflation differentials. This 
may be due to the presence of a default risk as a component of the spreads. 
The paper presents first a procedure to decompose the interest rate 
differentials into two main factors: the exchange rate risk and the default risk. The 
procedure shows that decomposition must be conducted on continuously 
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compounded interest rates. The default risk is then obtained as a residual from the 
following difference24 : 
DRj, t, T = SPj, t, T - ERj, t, T 
where DRj, t, T is the default risk premium at time t, on bonds issued in country j, 
with T periods maturity; 
SPj, t, T is the return differential, at time t, on bonds issued in country j, with 
respect to German rates and with T periods maturity; 
ERj, t, T is the exchange rate risk, at time t, given by the differential 
between fix rate swap contracts with same maturity (T periods) and 
denominated in currency of country j and in DM. 
The time series of default risk premium calculated as above and reported 
in the paper indicates that it is mostly positive for Italy along the time span of the 
analysis (January 1992-December 1995). It is often positive, but of smaller size 
for Spain and almost always negative for Sweden. 
Taking a V AR approach, the authors investigate on the statistical features 
of the series. Using daily data (excluding data for 1992 to avoid turbulence in the 
exchange rates due to the ERM crisis) for Italy and Spain, the authors find that 
yield spreads and exchange risk factors are non-stationary series and they are 
linked by a cointegration relationship for both countries. In particular, the 
co integrating vector is identified as the [1, -1] vector for Italy as well as for Spain, 
suggesting the stationary nature of the default risk premium. 
24 In their paper the authors consider a third factor due to different bonds taxation. The problem 
seems to be relevant for Italy and solved through a specific correction procedure. 
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Finally, the econometric analysis focuses on the dynamic response of the 
spreads, in the short run, to country specific and international shocks. The 
dynamic analysis provides an interesting explanation of the different pattern of the 
default risk in the two countries. In fact, country specific shocks vanish quite 
rapidly in the Spanish case, while they have a persistent effect on the Italian 
default risk. 
The two empirical works discussed in this section seem to agree on the 
geographical distribution of the default risk: 
a) default risk premium appears positive and significant for Italy; 
b) it is significant but smaller for Spain; 
c) it has a longer memory in the Italian case with respect the Spanish one. 
Alesina et al. (1992) suggest that a default risk is also incorporated in the 
interest rates of the Netherlands and Denmark, and in lower size in the Irish and 
Belgium rates. 
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Chapter 2 
Default Risk, Public Debt and EMU 
2.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter we have discussed some of the economic literature on 
sovereign debt default. Now we provide our contribution, presenting a model where 
default on public debt is considered. 
As we have discussed in the previous chapter, while default and inflation as 
tools of debt reductions have been separately investigated (see Calvo, 1988; Aghion 
and Bolton, 1990; Alesina, Prati and Tabellini, 1990; Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990), a 
joint consideration of the two instruments has not received much attention. In this 
respect, an innovative work is the recent study of Drudi and Giordano (1997) which 
analyses the effects of these two political options on the optimal debt maturity. The 
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study of the interaction of the two associated risks can shed light on the effects of 
EMU on high debt sustainability. EMU should imply giving up inflation as a tool to 
service public debt and this may lead to inflation risk turning into a higher explicit 
default risk. In this case, real interest rates will not converge after the monetary union. 
On the other hand, EMU membership may increase government credibility: will the 
reduced flexibility in responding to bad shocks be more than offset by the beneficial 
credibility effect? 
In the present and the following chapters we will show that a positive answer 
is likely. In fact, while the ability to inflate provides an easy tool to reduce real debt, 
it also leads (when anticipated) to high costs in terms of interest rate, which may even 
vanish the former effect. This time-inconsistency type of mechanism may induce an 
inflationary spiral making default more attractive. Somehow paradoxically, the lost of 
monetary sovereignty may result, through lower interest rates and increased 
credibility, in a 'lighter' debt service and lower default risk. 
In this chapter, we present a simple model which takes into consideration the 
government's decision process where the choice to give up the regular debt service is 
conditional on the realisation of an exogenous shock to the international real interest 
rate. In our framework, therefore, default is not a necessary consequence of a liquidity 
constraint, but the result of an explicit optimising process of the government. 
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The approach taken draws from the currency crisis literature, where explicitly 
modelling government's choices is increasingly popular (see de Kock and Grilli, 
1993; Obstfeld, 1994; Ozkan and Sutherland, 1994 and 1995). These kinds of models 
allow us to study the optimal mix of commitment and flexibility when an economy is 
subject to stochastic shocks. 
The model describes a three-period economy with two kinds of agents: the 
government and a large number of risk neutral investors. The government optimises 
its policy after observing both the investors' action and the realisation of a stochastic 
shock on international interest rate; whilst investors set the interest rate on public 
bonds incorporating their expectations on next period economic policy. 
The main feature of the model is the 'state dependent' nature of the optimal 
policy chosen by the government, which can decide to exercise the option to 
defaulting on part of its obligations in the bad states of the world. Private sector's 
expectations play a decisive role: taking into account the default probability they 
exacerbate the government's problem; moreover they affect the optimal economic 
policy and can generate multiple equilibria. 
The model is then extended to include inflation as well as default as a tool of 
debt reduction. The comparison of the two cases allows us to evaluate how EMU will 
affect default probability. 
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2.2 A Simple Model with Default Only 
2.2.1 The model 
Consider a three period economy, t=O, 1, 2, with two kinds of agents: 
investors and the government. Investors are a large number of risk neutral agents 
and represent the private sector of the economy, they are assumed to differ for 
their initial endowments, but have access to the same information set. 
The game starts in period 0, when the government issues a stock of public 
debt equal to boo Besides public bonds, there is a unique alternative available for 
saving: a foreign riskless asset, which yields a gross interest rate R; *1 in each 
period, assumed to be stochastic. Note that the foreign asset is riskless in the sense 
that R; * is always known at the time of purchase. All assets, domestic and foreign, 
have the same maturity equal to one period. This assumption will be relaxed in the 
next chapter, where short and long term bonds will be considered. 
Investors' action, in each period, consists in setting the gross interest rate 
R; at which they are willing to buy domestic bonds, accordingly to their 
expectations on next period economic policy and to the realisation of the current 
shock to the international interest rate. The government observes the interest rate 
and chooses the economic policy to finance an exogenous flow of public spending 
and to service the outstanding debt. The government's policy is given by a 
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combination of distortionary income taxes and new borrowing. However, for 
adverse realisations of shock, the government can exercise the option of defaulting 
on parts of its obligations. When this happens, it will no longer be able to borrow 
from the private sector. It is assumed that default is not allowed in the final 
period2; moreover, no debt can be issued in that period, as the government will not 
last long enough to pay it back. 
In the strategic game, the private sector acts in periods 0 and 1; whilst the 
government moves in periods 1 and 23. Therefore, the government enjoys an 
informative advantage with respect to the private sector. 
The exact timing of the economy is as follows: 
Period 0: In the initial period, the stochastic shock to the international interest rate 
is realised and it is observable by all the agents. The government issues a stock 
of public bonds bo (exogenously given) and investors set the domestic return 
accordingly to the non-arbitrage condition. Knowing government's 
preferences, in fact, they are able to calculate the expected default for next 
period and ask for a premium to compensate the risk. 
Period 1: At the beginning of the period the realisation of the foreign interest rate 
is observed and the government decides whether to serve the whole debt 
coming to maturity or to opt for a partial default. The economic policy is then 
I R*j is equal to (1+r*J where r*j is the international real interest rate in period i. 
2 Without this assumption the government will always optimise by defaulting in period 2. An 
alternative way is to adopt an infmite horizon model, but this would involve a more complex 
analytical framework. 
In the next chapter, an extension where default is allowed in the fmal period will be presented 
showing that the basic results of the model do not rely on that assumption. 
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chosen consistently to the default decision. Investors observe government's 
action and international interest rate: if default has occurred they turn to the 
foreign financial market, otherwise they invest in public bonds at the market 
return. The latter is equal to the international interest rate, as the new debt is 
now riskless. 
Period 2: In the final period, the government raises income taxes to finance public 
spending and meet debt obligations, if there are any (i.e., if the government did 
not default in period 1 and took out fresh loans), including interest. 
This order of events is shown in Figure 2.1. 
We now turn to an analytical description of the economy discussed above. 
Government's policy is set to minimise taxes in both periods and, possibly, the 
size of default. The objective function in periods 1 and 2 is given respectively by: 
(2.1) 
(2.2) 
The parameter a (>0) stands for unit cost of defaulted debt. As we will see 
later, default is penalised by precluded access to private capital market. However, 
as mentioned in the introduction, other costs may be considered, which are likely 
related to the size of default. In our context, a may be considered as a measure of 
the income dispersion among private agents and thus represent the redistribution 
3 In period 0, the government issues bo, this is assumed to be exogenous and has no strategic role in 
the game. 
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costs of default. () is the fraction of debt the government is going to default on, 
O~f):;l, and tj is the policy determined flow of income tax revenue in period 14. 
The objective function is assumed to be quadratic in the default size and 
linear in taxes5. The implication is that the policymaker dislikes tax distortions but 
is not interested in tax smoothing. This assumption reduces the scope for 
government's borrowing, but makes the model more handleable. More 
importantly, it allows the model to be analytically tractable when inflation is 
introduced. In principle, we expect that the cost of all default, taxes and inflation 
does not increase linearly. However, having all quadratic terms would increase the 
number of equilibria, making the interpretation of the results less clear. The choice 
to have default and, in next section, inflation costs both quadratic was suggested 
by our interest in considering the two instruments as closer substitutes, than they 
are with respect to taxation. Linear cost of taxes can be interpreted as an 
approximation of its (actual) quadratic form. Our results, however, should not be 
qualitatively affected as long as default cost does not enter the objective function 
in linear terms6. In fact, a linear cost implies that the corresponding policy 
instrument is used as a residual. 
4 Note that we are here normalising total income to 1. 
5 Linear-quadratic objective functions are not new in the macroeconomics literature (see Barro and 
Gordon 1983b; and Backus and Driffill, 1985). 
6 Linea; cost of default is considered by Drudi and Giordano (1997). This makes their results to 
depart from ours. 
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Given a discount factor equal to 8, we can combine (2.1) and (2.2) to get 
the following' intertemporal loss function': 
(2.3) 
The government budget constraints III the two periods are gIven, 
respectively, by: 
where if 0=0 if 0>0 
(2.4) 
(2.5) 
(2.6) 
is the new debt issued in period 17, and gi is the flow of government spending in 
period i (exogenously given). Equation (2.6) imposes a fixed cost to the default 
option, excluding the government from private capital market if obligations are 
not regularly met. The incentive to issuing debt is in that it allows to finance 
current spending while postponing taxes. Of course, the government will be 
willing to do so, as long as the cost of borrowing does not exceed 1/8. 
As mentioned above, bo is the stock of public bonds maturing in period 1, 
on which the interest rate Ro is due. bo are here interpreted as the real value of 
coupon bonds issued by the government8. 
7 Equation (2.6) assumes that the government does not lend to the private sector. "One motivation 
for this assumption is that private agents are anonymous so that debt claims against them are 
unenforceable" (Chari and Kehoe, 1993; p. 178). 
8 However, our model also works when interpreting bo as the real value of no coupon bonds. In this 
case, it is useful to note that the value of bonds declines when the interest rate increases. As a 
result, the government has to issue more bonds to fulfil its budget constraint (for example to 
fmance the exogenous flow of expenditure in period 0, not shown here), but the real value of the 
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Domestic interest rate is set by the private sector accordingly to the non-
arbitrage condition9. Taking into account the risk of default on bo, the nominal 
gross interest rate will be, in the two periods, respectively: 
(2.7) 
(2.8) 
where Eo['] is the expectation operator conditional on information set available at 
time O. Investors are rational and formulate their expectations knowing the 
government's objective function (2.3). Bonds issued in period 1 are perfectly safe 
and their return is equal to that on the foreign asset. The density function of the 
random shock is assumed to be uniform on the interval [v, ,u], with v~O and pO. 
Without loss of generality, in what follows we assume that the realisation of the 
shock in period 0 is equal to 1 (i.e. Ro*=l). 
When a large adverse shock hits the international rate of interest in period 
1, the high cost of new borrowing may induce the government to opt for default 
on part of its obligations. 
whole debt issued will still equal to the same amount ba. This does not affect the [mal default size 
as it is calculated on the whole amount of payments due in period 1, boRa. 
9 No-arbitrage condition applies as agents are risk neutral; nevertheless, the hypothesis, implicit in 
the (2.6), that investors do not want to buy a fare lottery once default has occurred, is somehow 
contradictory with risk-neutrality. One possible interpretation is that default occurring changes 
agents' attitude towards risk. This problem is common to most of default literature and will not be 
investigate further here. However we like to thank Driffill for making this point clear. 
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In period 1, the policymaker observes the realisation of the shock on the 
interest rate and decides whether to issue new borrowing or default on part of its 
debt. The optimal policy is chosen by minimising the intertemporal loss function 
(subject to the budget constraints, the realisation of the shock R/, the level of 
outstanding debt and the domestic interest rate Ro) with respect to f) and hI. 
Solving the minimisation of (2.3) under the alternative policies of default and no-
default gives, respectively, the following optimal policy rules: 
(i) default case: 
(ii) no-default case: 
f)= 0 
if R; ~ 1/5 
if R; > 1/5 
if R; ~ 1/5 
if R; > 1/5 
t2 = {(boRo + gJ)R; + g2 
g2 
if RJ* ~ 1/5 
if RJ* > 1 / 5 
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(2.9) 
(2.10) 
(2.11) 
(2.12) 
(2.13) 
(2.14) 
(2.15) 
(2.16) 
From equation (2.9), default size appears to be an increasing function of 
the period 0 interest rate. This result is consistent with findings in Calvo (1988). 
Equations (2.14)-(2.16) indicate that under the no-default policy optimal 
rules may change in different shock intervals. As mentioned above, when the 
shock is higher than the inverse of government's discount factor, the cost of 
borrowing (as measured in terms of cost of raising taxes to pay back debt in 
period 2) exceeds the benefit from current loans. In this case, the government 
refrains from issuing new bonds in period 1, relying on fiscal revenue only (even 
though investors would be happy to lend). On the other hand, whenever the shock 
is lower than 11 J, the government benefits from borrowing to postpone payment 
for today's spending. When this is the case, the tax burden is born totally in the 
last period 10. 
2.2.2 The government's decision rule 
Clearly, the government will decide to repay fully its debt whenever: 
(2.17) 
where the superscripts d and nd state the value of the loss function under the two 
different policies. 
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For what follows, we introduce the simplifying assumption that gl =g2=O. 
Figure 2.2 compares diagrammatically the two loss functions, at different values 
of the interest rate shock. Ld is a constant equal to b R 2a - boRo «boRo) for 
o 0 2a 
whatever value of the shock, while Lnd describes a line with a kink at RJ *=1/8: for 
RJ * between vand 118 it grows linearly and thereafter it stays constant at boRo. 
The plot shows that when the shock is higher than 1/8, default is the 
optimal policy. This is an intuitive result following from what discussed above: 
* . 
when RJ > 118 the government does not want to borrow and this make the fix cost 
of default ineffective and that option attractive. However default may be optimum 
even for lower values of the shock. At RJ *= R, the government is indifferent 
-
between the two alternatives. In fact, R gives a shock upperbound above which 
the government has no incentive to repay fully its debtll. It is easy to show that as 
-
Ro increases the threshold R, detennining the optimal policy, declines. 
In analytical tenns, no-default will be the best government's strategy 
whenever: 
* - R) - 2a - bo Ro R1 ~ R( 0 = --2a-8-- (2.18) 
10 This 'bang-bang' nature of the solution, which makes the government switching from borrowing 
to taxation in a discontinuous way at R*I=lIt5, is due to the linearity of the taxation term in the loss 
function. 
II From what said above it follows that this threshold is always lower than 110. 
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The above equation describes a linear function of the initial interest rate , 
with negative slope. Hereafter we will call the function (2.18) the Government 
Default Boundary (GDB). 
The negative slope of the GDB implies that the higher is the period 0 
interest rate demanded by the private sector for holding public bonds, the higher is 
the debt burden and the fiscal pressure, thus the higher is the incentive for the 
government to implement the default option. In other words, for higher Ro, it takes 
* a smaller value of the shock (RJ ) to make the government decide for a partial 
repudiation. 
2.2.3 The private sector's decision rule 
Now we tum to specify how investors determine debt interest rate in 
period 0, such that they are indifferent between purchasing public bonds or save in 
foreign assets. This will lead to an endogenised probability of default, and will 
clarify the interaction between the government's and private sector's actions. 
At time 0, expected default is given by default size times its probability, 
I.e.: 
Eo[O] =p () 
Where size () is perfectly anticipated by the agents as given by (2.9), while 
probability of default occurring is derived by the density distribution of the 
stochastic shock: 
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(2.19) 
otherwise 
where R e IS the expected value of the default trigger point set by the 
govemment12. Replacing equations (2.19) and (2.9) into the non-arbitrage 
condition (2.7), we get13 : 
R -o -
a(,u - v) - a(,u - v{ a(,u - v) - 4bo(,u - R')) 
2bo(fJ - R e ) 
1 
(2.20) 
For aZ4bo, equation (2.20) defines Ro for all possible values of R e E[V,,u]. 
However, if a<4bo interest rate on initial stock of debt is not defined for 'high' 
default probabilities (how 'high' depending on the actual value of a). The 
intuition is that for very low unit cost of default, private investors are not willing 
to purchase public bonds at any finite interest rate. At a given interest rate and 
with a low value of a, (2.9) and (2.18) may induce p and B to exceed 1 and no 
solution to the no-arbitrage condition exists. Imposing them the unit upperbound 
makes Ro jumps to infinity. 
12 Note that since the expression determining R, depends only on Ro and the structural parameters 
of the model, and it is common knowledge, when setting the interest rate, the agents can perfectly 
forecast default probability. However, for convenience we refer to the expression (2.19) where 
probability is an inverse function of the expected threshold. When calculation equilibria, the true 
-
value of R is replaced and results are not affected. 
13 Here we consider only the negative root from the solution of the equation (2.7), as the positive 
one does not satisfies the continuity condition when default probability goes to zero (i.e. when 
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From (2.20) the interest rate appears to be a decreasing function of the 
expected threshold chosen by the government: 
Ro =rp(Re) 
with rp'<O and rp' '>0. 
(2.21) 
We refer to the condition (2.21) as the Debt Interest Rate L(!~us (DIRL), it 
gives the minimum interest rate at which investors are willing to hold domestic 
bonds for any possible value of R e (inside the shock range). 
The intuition for the negative slope of this curve is straightforward. If, 
given the initial conditions, investors expect a lower value of the trigger point, 
they will ask for a higher risk premium above the international interest rate to hold 
government assets. 
2.2.4 Determination of equilibria 
An equilibrium of the model is given by a couple (ROE, RE) (where the 
superscript E indicates equilibrium), which satisfies the following properties: 
(a) either it solves both equations (2.18) and (2.20) with Re = R and 
REE[V,,u], 
or RE =v, and R [rp(v)]<v, 
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Although the algebraic framework of the model does not permit simple 
analytical expressions for those levels, we are still able to draw out some features 
of the equilibria. 
It is worth noticing that a multiplicity of equilibria can emerge in the 
model. In particular, the number of equilibria depends on the parameter a and 8. 
A necessary but not sufficient condition to observe more than one equilibrium is 
that: 
(7 J.i + 2v)(J.i - v) + (3J.i - 2v)~(9 J.i - v)(J.i - v) 
a < bo =a* 4 J.i(J.i - v) (2.22) 
Numerical investigation suggests that the region defined in the (2.22) is 
not empty for any value of v ~O and jJ> v. When a satisfies the above condition 
(2.22), the parameter is detennines six regions where both the number and the 
characteristics of the equilibria change. When a2a* instead, the equilibrium is 
unique. is still discriminates the regions which characterise the equilibrium, in this 
latter case, however, only three of them seem to be relevant: the region where 
default is a certain event; the region where it occurs with a positive, but lower than 
I, probability; the region where it is an impossible event. Figure 2.3 illustrates the 
two possible cases: (a) 4bo~a<a*; (b) a2a*; and how the corresponding 
equilibria change for different values of 8. Table 2.1 summarises those results. 
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Equilibria EJ and E3 (Figure 2.3) are characterised by no uncertainty and 
represent the case of no-default and sure default, respectively. The corresponding 
optimal default sizes are given by: 
(where the number as sUbscript of the variable indicates the corresponding kind of 
equilibrium). The equilibrium values of the initial gross interest rate and those of 
the trigger point appear in the table 1. 
Equilibria like E2 correspond to the uncertainty equilibria where the 
probability of default is inversely related to the shock threshold (as implied by 
equation (2.19)). The optimal default size is given accordingly to the (2.9). As 
mentioned above, reduced forms for the equilibrium values are not provided, 
however the graphical analysis allow some attempts of comparative static. 
Figure 2.3 shows that probability of default declines for lower t5. When the 
government is more impatient, it cares less about the debt repayment in period 2. 
For a given shock it is more willing to borrow rather than defaulting on its 
obligations. This result may appear counterintuitive: usually an impatient 
government is thought to be less worried about future access to private loans. 
However, in our model no debt can be issued in the final period and the cost of 
default is fully born in the current period. 
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A change in the parameter a affects the equilibria in a more standard way: 
an increase in a produces an upward shift of the GDB around the point (R rFO , 
-
R=liO), whilst the curve DIRL moves leftward turning around the point (Ro=l, 
-
R = p). The net effect is lowering both the default probability and the period 0 
interest rate. However, the effect is zero when J~JJ, that is when default is never 
optimal, i.e.pE =0 and RoE=l. 
A higher initial debt bo has the same effect as a lower a, that is it implies 
greater default probability and higher interest rate. Again, this is not surprising as 
an high indebtedness increases benefits from defaulting. 
2.3 Inflation and Default Risk 
In this section we turn to investigate the debt servicing problem of a 
policymaker facing four possibilities: a) roll over its debt entirely; b) inflate away 
part of its real value; c) default on part of public bonds; d) use a combination of 
inflation and default. 
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2.3.1 The model 
The economy is the same as the one described in the previous section, 
where now we introduce inflation, besides default, as an option of debt reduction. 
Timing is unchanged and inflation is set as a new tool of economic policy: its 
level is decided consistently to default decision in period 1, and at the same time 
as the tax level in period 2. 
In this setting, we assume that the two 'debt-cheating' tools will enter the 
government's objective function with different weights. Hence, the intertemporal 
loss function can be rewritten as: 
a 2 r 2 L = - () + - ZI + tl + l5 L2 
2 2 
(2.23) 
where (2.24) 
is last period objective function. 
The government's budget constraints in the two periods are modified, 
respectively, as: 
(2.25) 
(2.26) 
where b I is still given by the (2.6) and Zi = 7ri is the inflation index in period i 1 + 7ri 
(7r; is the inflation rate in the same period). The rest of the tenninology being 
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known from the previous section. In this version of the model, the current debt is 
still in real terms, i.e. bi = Bi where Bi is the nominal value of debt issued at time ~ 
i and Pi is the price level in the same period. 
In sett~ng the interest rate on public bonds, the private sector now takes 
into account the expected inflation as well as default. Following the arbitrage 
condition the gross interest rates in the two periods will be: 
(2.27) 
(2.28) 
where Eo['] is defined as in the prevIOUS section. R/ is still assumed to be 
stochastic with the same uniform distribution on the interval [v, p], and again we 
suppose that Ro *=1. Unlike the previous case, the interest rate in period 1 does no 
longer equate the international interest rate as now the agents demand for an 
inflation premium. In period 0, this premium is added to the default premium. 
High realisations of the shock can still trigger the default option at the cost of the 
exclusion from the private financial market. 
The optimisation problem needs now to be solved backwards, considering 
first how the government will act in period 214. 
14 Because of all choice variables were determined in period 1, in the previous section, we could 
solve the minimisation of the intertemporal loss function in one step. 
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Assuming that the government did not default in period 1, in the final 
period it observes the values for bi and RJ and chooses the inflation rate to 
minimise equation (2.24) subject to (2.26). Under the assumption that gl =g2=0, 
optimal inflation is a constant fraction of current debt burden, where the size of 
the fraction is inversely related to the inflation cost: 
(2.29) 
Note that if the government did trigger the default option, then b i =0 and 
there is no incentive to use inflation in period 2. However, any time bI>O, the 
government will inflate away debt obligations. This is taken into account by 
private investors as RI setting depends on their expectations on Z2 (see equation 
(2.28)). Assuming rational expectations, we can use (2.28) and (2.29) for solving 
simultaneously for inflation and interest rate to getI5 : 
(2.30) 
(2.31) 
Note that inflation in the last period is fully anticipated by the private 
sector and incorporated in the interest rate. Thus it has no effect on reducing the 
debt burden; nevertheless the government cannot credibly commit itself to a zero 
inflation policy (time inconsistency problem). 
15 Note that from (2.29) we want Z2=0 for b}=O. To satisfy this condition only the negative root, i.e. 
equation (2.30) is considered. Equation (2.31) follows directly from (2.30). 
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The above equations (2.30) and (2.31) allow us to express L2 as a function 
of bI and solve the government's problem in period 1. The minimisation of the 
intertemporalloss function (2.23) under the alternative options of default and no-
default gives the optimal rules to set the endogenous variables I6 : 
(i) default case: 
() = b R r - boRo 
o 0 b2R2 ar- 0 0 
Zd = b R a - bo Ro 
} 0 0 b2R2 ar- 0 0 
(ii) no-default case: 
()= 0 
o 
t} = boRo (r - boRo) 
r 
r(1- 8R;) 
R; (2 - 8R;)2 
(2.32) 
(2.33) 
(2.34) 
(2.35) 
(2.36) 
(2.37) 
(2.38) 
(2.39) 
16 As in the previous section, for shock realisation above 11 t5, the government does ?ot want to 
borrow. To simplify the exposition, in what follows we assume that this never happens, 1. e. j.J5:1/0. 
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boRoCY -boRo) -
y if v ~ R; < X 
b)= 
y(l-oR)*) (2.40) -
R;C2-0R;)2 if X ~ R; ~ J..l 
boRoCy-boRo)R)* -
y if v ~ R; < X 
t2= yC1-oR)*) (2.41) -
C2 - OR;)2 if X ~ R)* ~ J..l 
Equation C2.39) shows a zero lowerbound for the level of taxes. x in equations 
C2.39) to C2.41) indicates the value of the shock below which optimal taxation 
would be negative, however for such values we impose the constraint t1=017. It is 
worth noticing that the value of the shock at which optimal taxes are zero is not 
constant, and is a function of the initial interest rate R018. 
2.3.2 The government's decision rule 
As in the previous case, government's optimal policy is taken comparing 
the objective function under the two options, but the policy choice is now between 
17 Non-negative taxes are assumed in the previous section; here the assumption is not necessary, 
but we retain it to have comparable results. In the next chapter, negative taxes will be allowed, 
showing that relaxing this constraint does not affect the main results of the model. 
18 Moreover, numerical investigation indicates that for most values of the parameters of the model 
the interval [v, x] is empty and optimal taxes are always positive. 
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inflate away part of the debt burden or to use a combination of inflation and 
default 19• The former will be government's best action if: 
(2.42) 
The two functions are shown in Figure 2.4 (which corresponds to Figure 
2.2 after introducing inflation). Ld is still constant to shock variation, in fact when 
default occurs b 1=0 and the economy is insulated from international interest rate 
movements. The L nd is instead an increasing function of the shock. 
Comparing the mInImUm loss under the alternative policies, the 
government will avoid default any time that20: 
2HK _H2 -6r 2K +r~6K(6r2K -2HK +H2) 
- H6K 
R; ~R(Ro)= r-----
H2 +6r2K -H~H2 +6r2K 
(2.43) 
6(H2 + 6r 2 K) 
and 
We can look at the (2.43) as 2-step rule for the government to decide about 
-
its best policy: the policymaker first observes the shock and compares it with x 
(which, knowing Ro, is just a number), then he/she compares it with the relevant 
section of equation (2.43) and decides whether or not to default on debt. 
Equation (2.43) represents the GDB in the case where inflation is allowed. 
The function gives an upperbound for the range of the shocks that do not trigger 
19 Inflation rate will usually be different in the two regimes. 
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default. The shape of this function is ambiguous, but simulations suggest it 
describe a decreasing function of period 0 interest rate2!. As discussed in the 
previous section, this negative relationship is consistent with our intuition: a 
higher Ro makes the debt service more expensive and partial default more 
attractive. 
2.3.3 The private sector's decision rule 
Finally we need to describe how investors determinate the interest rate in 
the initial period. This requires specifying how they form expectations on next 
period economic policy. It departs from the previous section as now expected 
inflation is involved as well. Assuming rational expectations, the anticipated value 
of a unit of debt purchased in period 0 and with maturity in period 1 will be (at the 
date of maturity): 
Eo[(1-8)(1- Zl)] = (1- p)(1- Z;d) + p(1- 8)(1- z~) (2.44) 
where p is still given by (2.19). After substituting (2.32) (2.33) (2.38) and (2.19) 
into (2.44), and using the latter to solve (2.27) with respect to Ro, would give the 
DIRL function for the inflation case: 
-
20 It is worth to remind that x is function of Ro. 
21 At least in a relevant range of Ro. 
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Even if no analytical solution is obtainable for this function, we can still calculate 
its inverse function: 
(2.45) 
where H and K are defined above and 
This function gives the value of the default trigger point which is expected 
by private investors when they set a given interest rate. 
Like in the benchmark model, an equilibrium is defined as a couple (ROE, 
RE ) which satisfies equation (2.43) and (2.45) simultaneously with Re = R and 
RE E[V, ,u], and such that the corresponding f}E, z\ E and Z2 E all E[O, 1]. Comer 
equilibria are given by: 
-
RE =v, and R [¥/( V)] < V, 
-
RE -~ and R [¥/ (,u)]>,u; 
when associated to values of f) E, Z\E and zl still lying inside the close interval 
[0, 1]. 
Again, we are unable to find an analytical expression for equilibrium 
variables. In the next section we present the results obtained from numerical 
solution of the model in both cases examined respectively in the previous and 
present section, and we will discuss the implications of giving up inflation as a 
tool to reduce the debt burden. 
71 
However, it seems useful to gIve a simple intuition of the effects of 
introducing inflation on the GOB and OIRL functions in terms of Figure 2.322 . For 
simplicity, we consider only the case when a unique equilibrium emerges. For a 
given interest rate demanded by private investors on period 0 bonds, the 
government can now finance its debt service partly inflating away its value. The 
intuition is then that the policymaker will trigger default less frequently, and GOB 
curve moves up. On the other hand, due to the inflation risk incorporated in the 
interest rate (equation 2.27), for each value of the expected default threshold, 
private agents will ask for a higher interest rate, such that OIRL is expected 
shifting rightwards. Whether the new outcome is characterised by higher or lower 
default probability (with respect to the no inflation case) depends on the relative 
shift of the two curves. As we are going to show in the next section, numerical 
analysis suggests that the rightward shift of OIRL curve is large enough to induce 
the government to opt for a partial default with higher probability. 
22 Note that the two functions will now be shaped differently, in particular the GDB curve will no 
longer be a straight line, but a convex curve. 
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2.4. Some Numerical Results 
In the prevIOUS sections, we presented a model where a benevolent 
government can use default and (in section 2) inflation to reduce the current debt. 
However we have seen that, even with such a simple model, an explicit 
determination of the existing equilibria is not obtainable. To the end of identifying 
the optimal economic policies and quantifying the endogenous variables in the 
equilibrium, numerical solution techniques have been adopted23 . 
We have chosen to standardise the model with respect to debt issued at 
time 0, i. e. we set bo= ]24. Moreover, as support of the shock density function we 
have considered 2 alternative intervals: [v, /-l]=[l, 2] and [v, .u]=[l, 1.2], which 
correspond to a rate of interest varying between 0% and 100% in the former case 
and between 0% and 20% in the latter. Tables 2.2 and 2.3 summarise the results 
obtained from the two possible shock ranges respectively, and choosing different 
values for the parameters of the government's objective function: a, rand 0. 
In the two tables, the equilibrium values of the following variables are 
reported: 
• period 0 gross interest rate and shock trigger point; 
23 Simulations have been implemented using 'Mathematica' package (version 3.0) through 
'FindRoot' procedure. In particular, the convergence criterion adopted is the 'secant method' (for 
details on implementation see Wolfram, 1991). 
24 Given the assumption to normalise the income to 1 (see section 1, note 12), we are here 
assuming that the debt/GDP ratio is equal to 100%. This case could be a good description ~f 
countries such as Belgium and Italy. However this assumption does not affect the mam 
implications of our results. 
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• optimal default size; 
• default probability 
• default risk premium (given by the product of the two previous terms). 
The above quantities are shown for the model with default only as well as 
for the one where inflation is also allowed. In this latter case, the tables provide 
figures also for: 
• total risk premium (RP) (calculated as one minus the expected value of a unit 
of debt as by equation (2.44)); 
• optimal inflation rate in the default regime; 
• optimal inflation rate in the no-default regime. 
The main result emerging from a first look at the tables is that from all 
simulations default probability is higher when both instruments are available 
compared to the situation when inflation is not allowed. 
This result is quite surprising as the lost of one policy instrument could be 
thought to lead to a more frequent use of the other25• Where does our result come 
from, then? 
The introduction of inflation in the analytical framework affects the 
probability of default in two opposite directions: 
a) Government's objective function (2.23) implies that, ceteris paribus, a 
combination of inflation and default is preferred to using one instrument only. 
25 Drudi and Giordano (1997) obtain results which are consistent with this intuition. 
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Thus, when the government opts for a partial default, the welfare loss is lower 
when inflation is available. 
In terms of Figure 2.2, this means that the line Ld moves downward. This is 
shown in Figure 2.5, where the shift produces a negative effect on the threshold 
-
R implying a higher probability of default. 
b) An opposite effect involves the government's loss function in the no-default 
regime. Let's first assume that the government can credibly commit itself to a 
no-inflation policy in the final period, i.e. Z2=O. The possibility to inflate away 
part of the real value of the debt in period 1 has an ambiguous effect on 
welfare: on the one hand, inflation reduces debt burden and thus fiscal 
pressure; on the other, it implies a more than proportional cost on the 
government's loss function. The size of the shift depends positively on the 
shock realisation and it is possible to show that in the neighbourhood of the 
critical threshold, the former effect dominates the latter so that Lnd moves 
-
downward (locally). The effect on R is now positive and the higher threshold 
would lead to a lower default probability. 
If we relax the assumption Z2=O, the downward shift of the curve Lnd is 
dampened. This is because last period inflation is fully anticipated and has no 
beneficial effect on debt burden, while it induces a cost in the welfare loss 
function. In this case the L nd is higher than in the partial commitment case. 
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It is possible to prove that, under the assumption of Z2=O, the net effect on 
the default trigger point is positive (as it is shown by the new threshold R' in 
Figure 2.5) and consequently the default probability is lower when inflation is 
available to face the shock (see Appendix 2). 
However, if we allow the government to use inflation any time, the total 
effect on R is not univocally determinated and is not possible to calculate 
whether default probability will be higher or lower when inflation is given up. To 
draw some conclusions about this, we rely on our numerical exercise. Simulation 
results are consistent in showing that the negative effect outlined at point a) 
strictly dominates the positive effect discussed at point b). They suggest that the 
final effect of loosing access to monetisation is to increase the shock threshold 
(from R" to R in Figure 2.5) and reduce default probability. 
The intuition behind this argument is that a credible no-inflation 
commitment helps to solve a time inconsistency problem: when government relies 
on inflation to reduce the real debt burden, this is anticipated by the private sector 
which demands a risk premium on bond interest rates; this in turn pushes the 
government to increase inflation. The vicious circle is broken when increasing 
costs of inflation make default more attractive. However, if the government is 
credibly believed to use inflation only to dampen adverse shocks, then the time 
inconsistency does not arise and inflation can partly substitute for default. 
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The comparison of the two versions of the model suggests that joining a 
low inflation agreement (such as, for example, joining EMU) will lead to a 
credibility gain which more than offset the loss of monetary sovereignty. In 
particular, this result applies to countries with long history of loose monetary 
policy which cannot credibly commit to a low inflation policy. This view is 
supported by recent narrowing of the sovereign risk spreads on benchmark bonds. 
We will come back to this issue in chapter 4. 
On the other hand, our analysis suggests that countries with low inflation 
experience but soft fiscal discipline (Belgium may be a good example), may loose 
a useful tool to reduce debt burden in bad states of the world. 
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Appendix 2 
We want to show here that if the government can credibly commit itself to 
use inflation only to face adverse shocks, the effect of loosing this instrument of 
policy is a higher default probability. 
-
In terms of Figure 2.5 we want to show that R s R', where R is the default 
trigger point of the shock in case inflation is not available, while R' is the trigger 
point when inflation is used only in period 1 (when shock realises). In the fonner 
case, we know that: 
and optimal strategy is to default any time that the shock is above that value. 
Now suppose inflation is allowed but the government can commit to Z2=O. 
. . • * 2a - bo Ro . d We want to see which IS the best polIcy at RI = . To this en we are 
2ao 
going to calculate the new value of the loss functions under the two policies of 
* 2a -boRo h default and no-default and compare them. At RI = we ave: 
2ao 
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Lnd _ Ld = boRo (boRo + 2(r - boRo )(2a - boRo )J _ boRo (2ar - ahoRo - rboRo) = 
2r 2a 2(ar -bg Rg) 
= boRo (2ahoRo + 2(r - boRo)(2a - boRo) _ 2ar -aboRo - rboRo J = 
2 2ar ar-bgRg 
=_ bgRg(a-boRo)(r-boRo) <01 
2ar(ar - bg R~) -
The optimal policy is then not to default on debt. As the loss function is 
monotonic in the shock, we conclude that when inflation is allowed in period 1 
(but not in period 2) default threshold is higher and therefore default probability is 
lower. 
I The result follows assuming that Rosmin{ albo, ylbo}, which is necessary to have both e and ZJ 
inside the unit interval [0, 1]. 
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Chapter 3 
Default and Inflation Risk and the Maturity Structure of 
Debt 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter we have presented a model where an optimising 
government could use default and inflation to reduce the debt burden. In 
particular, we were interested in comparing default probabilities under different 
inflation policies: one with no inflation allowed (or inflation policy delegated to 
an external authority, such as the European Central Bank); the other with inflation 
as a political instrument of debt reduction set by the government. In this chapter 
we are going to present an application of the previous model, focusing on debt 
maturity structure and its effects on default probability. 
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Introducing bonds with different maturities will allow us to investigate 
further on the robustness of our results, as well as to draw some implications for 
the debt management policy in and out EMU. 
An interesting paper studying the strategic role for debt management 
policy in relation to joining EMU is presented by Uhlig (1996). The author 
suggests that high inflationary governments may have the temptation to issue long 
term debt to raise political consensus in joining the single currency agreement. 
The argument relies on the assumption that the creditors believe EMU will be a 
lower inflation regime, and will protect them from the risk of devaluation of their 
long term nominal bonds. This should induce them to vote for membership. The 
author, however, shows that the result is fragile, and the political trick is not 
advisable. 
The topic of the optimal structure of debt maturity in relation to a risk of 
debt crisis has been studied by Alesina et al (1990), Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) 
and Drudi and Giordano (1997). The first of those papers considers the possibility 
of an outright default on public debt, the second regards a devaluation of nominal 
bonds. And only the last one take into account inflation and default as different 
instruments available to the government. In all the papers the risk of crisis is 
reduced with a longer maturity structure, and with a uniform distribution of debt 
coming due in each period. 
Our model is in the spirit of Drudi and Giordano's paper, but here the 
emphasis is on the implications of delegating monetary policy to an exogenous 
authority such as the European Central Bank. In fact, the situation where the 
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government cannot monetise the debt while it can still default on it is not deeply 
investigated by the two Italian authors. 
The model is very close to the one presented in the previous chapter, 
however, beside the introduction of short and long term debt, a further element 
will make the framework to depart from the one discussed earlier. In the present 
context, in fact, we are going to relax the hypothesis that default is an available 
option only in period 1. Real tax on outstanding bonds will now be allowed in the 
final period too, with income taxes and inflation. In particular, this will reduce 
asymmetry with respect to inflation. We have seen at the end of last chapter, that 
our results fail to hold when we constrain the government to a no-inflation policy 
in period 2. We now want to reverse the exercise allowing all instruments of 
policy in both periods. However, the main source of asymmetry between default 
and inflation, given by the government's exclusion from the credit market when 
default is triggered, will still apply. 
The new framework will permit a more general analysis of the topic and 
will allow an analytical qualification of the results drawn by numerical analysis in 
the previous chapter. 
3.2 A Model with Default Only 
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3.2.1 Model with default only 
The basic structure of the model is very similar to the one described in the 
previous chapter. Two are the main differences introduced here: 
• The government issues short and long term debt. This means that bo is now 
given by the sum of two different bonds b/ and bo', the former maturing after 
1 period, while the latter after 2 periods. In period 1, the only debt that 
government can issue is short term, b /, as it is not lasting long enough to pay 
back long term bonds. As we have already seen, for the same reason no debt is 
issued in the final period. 
• Default is allowed in the final period and not only at t= 1. As we already know 
from the last chapter, this assumption of course implies that government 
always will use default in period 2 (in fact threat of exclusion from financial 
market does not hold in the final period). The issue is then which is the 
optimal default size, given the interest rate demanded by private investors. 
This assumption will introduce a link between the amount of debt issued in 
period 1 and its cost. The absence of this link in the model with default only 
analysed in section 2.2, was there responsible for the need of a non-negativity 
constraint on income taxes. In fact, without it the government was willing to 
borrow from the private sector as much as it was allowed. This will not hold 
here any longer and we will get some nice insights on our results. 
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Timing is unchanged with respect to Figure 2.1, the only difference being 
default allowed in the last period when t2 is set. 
Allowing default in period 2 leads to the government's intertemporalloss 
function (2.3) to be modified as follows: 
(3.1) 
with (3.2) 
Whilst taking into account debt composition in short and long term bonds, 
we get the new budget constraints of the government: 
(3.3) 
(3.4) 
where we still have (3.5) 
Symbols are the same as in the previous model and the superscript s and I indicate 
the short and long debt maturity. Equation (3.5) has now a new implication, as it 
shows an asymmetry in the default punishment whether it is occurring in period 1 
or 2. In fact, since no more indebtedness can be hold on in the last period, a 
policymaker defaulting at that time will bear only a proportional cost a, while 
opting for default in period 1 will involve an additional financial autarky cost. An 
interesting consequence is that this will bring our work to depart from most of the 
finite horizon literature involving repeated games. In the usual setting, when 
cheating is the best strategy in the last period of the game, backward induction 
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procedure implies that it will be implemented in period 1 (Alesina et aI, 1990, 
presents an example relevant to our case). However in our model the rules of the 
game change with time (equation (3.5) applies only in period 1 and not in period 
2) and we will see that even if default is always the best policy in period 2 it is not 
necessarily adopted in period 11. 
Assuming perfect knowledge of the government objective function (3.1) 
by the private sector, interest rates on different bonds will be set, to avoid 
arbitrage opportunities, as follows: 
(3.6) 
(3.7) 
(3.8) 
where (3.6) is the same as (2.7). (3.7) describes a composite interest rate for 
holding a long term bond for two periods. It involves expectations on both next 
period world interest rate and period 2 default size. Finally, (3.8) corresponds to 
(2.8) but incorporates a risk premium for possible default in the final period. 
Foreign rate is still a random variable with same support [v, p] defined in section 
2.2.1 and the assumption Ro*=1 applies here too. In what follows we assume that 
I Note that the observation mentioned in note 7 in the last chapter is here even more relevant. In 
fact, we are assuming that private agents are willing to hold bonds that will be defaulted for sure 
(even if in a small amount), but only if default is not occurred yet. This again implies that the event 
of default changes somehow agents' preferences. 
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the world interest rate is never above the inverse of the government's discount 
factor, i.e. ;61/ J. 
To find the government's best strategy that minimises equation (3.1), we 
need to solve the problem backward. So, we move to investigate the government's 
behaviour in the final period and later we will go back to period 1. 
3.2.2 Period 2 problem 
Let's first assume that the government did not default in period 1. If this is 
the case, then in the final period it has to finance the outstanding debt burden 
(bOIR/ +b / R/) plus an exogenous spending g2. As mentioned above, new funds 
cannot be raised from the credit market and fiscal budget must be covered using 
tax revenue. As taxes are distortionary, the government may find it convenient to 
renege on part of its debt. The policymaker, then will choose a default size B2 to 
minimise (3.2) subject to (3.4). This gives a value of 
(3.9) 
According to intuition, default size increases with debt burden and declines with 
its own marginal cost. Once that the optimal B2 is calculated, optimal tax revenue 
is obtained by the budget constraint (3.4) and is equal to: 
(3.10) 
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replacing the optimal values of B2 and t2 into L2 gives 
Lnd =(bIRI bSRS)2a-(b~R~+btRt) 2 0 0 + 1 1 +g2 2a (3.11) 
where the superscript nd indicates that no default occurred III period 1, the 
superscript d will be used to indicate the opposite case. 
Suppose now that the government, instead, did default on debt in period 1. 
Then no bonds are issued at that time and optimal fiscal variables B2 and t 2 will 
still be given by (3.9) and (3.10) respectively, just setting b/=O, which gives: 
(3.12) 
d blRI a-b~R~ 
t2 = 0 0 +g2 2a 
(3.13) 
Government loss in the final period will then be: 
Ld _ bl R' 2a -b~R~ +g 
2 - 0 0 2a 2 (3.14) 
Note that, whether B]=O or not, choosing B2=0 will make the government 
no better off, thus in period 2 it opts for a partial default with probability 1 and 
2 With 82=0 the loss function would be 2 (b l 1)1 + bS RS ) { B) Lz = (b~~ +b: R:)+ gz ~ (b~~ +bi'R:) a- 0;: I I + gz == (b~~ +b: R: \1-; + gz 
where the greater or equal sign holds as 0~82~1. The same holds applied to the (3.14). 
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default will always be positive except for both bol and b /=0 and/or a~oo. This is 
not true in period 1, when it can choose between partial default and new 
borrowing. As in the previous chapter, the government sets its period-l-fiscal-
policy after calculating the optimal values of its choice variables under the two 
alternatives and comparing the respective losses. However government's loss is 
not independent from the investors' decision on R/, which in tum depends on the 
amount of new bonds to be allocated. Thus, we need now to see how private 
investors price new borrowing. 
3.2.3 Period 1 problem 
When the bonds b / are issued, the private agents observe the shock on the 
international interest rate and set R/, knowing the government's incentive to 
default on a fraction B/d of them with probability 1. Of course, they will be 
willing to hold public bonds only if they can get a fair premium above the world 
interest rate to be compensated for the future loss. Replacing (3.9) into (3.8) gives 
the interest rate demanded on short term debt: 
(3.15) 
Equation (3.15) shows that, not only does the interest rate increase with the 
amount of new issued debt b /, but also does with the amount of outstanding long 
term indebtedness and its cost R/ This is because those variables increase the 
88 
default size the government is going to implement in period 2, and thus the risk 
premium demanded by agents. 
In period 1 the government has to decide whether to finance its budget 
deficit thrDugh a combination of income taxes and new borrowing or to opt for a 
partial default. In the latter case of course tax on existing bonds will exclude 
access to the credit market again, while income tax revenue is still available. The 
policymaker optimises its intertemporal objective function (3.1) under the two 
alternatives and compares the outcomes. 
If the government decides to fully serve its debt coming due, beside 
income tax revenue it has the opportunity to issue new short term bonds, at a cost 
given by the (3.15). The optimal amount of new borrowing is found by 
mInImIsIng: 
where L2 is given by (3.11). It is immediate clear that the optimal amount of bonds 
to be allocated must satisfy the following condition: 
Taking into account of the effect of b/ on R/, the optimal solution for the amount 
new short term debt is given by: 
bS _ (a-b~R~Y(I-JR;) 
1 - aR;(2-JR;Y (3.16) 
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Equation (3.16) indicates that government's incentive to issue debt in period 1 
decreases with high shock realisations and high stocks of long term bonds. This is 
due to the effect of the raised cost of borrowing induced by both those factors. On 
the other hand, a high value of a reduces the risk premium and increases 
indebtedness. 
The corresponding government's loss is now equal to : 
(a - b~R~ Y (1- 8R; Y 
2aR)* (2 - 8Rl* ) (3.17) 
When the government, instead, opts for a partial default, it chooses the 
optimal default size ()j to minimise the intertemporalloss function (3.1) subject to 
its budget constraint (3.2) and to assumption that b/=O (eq.(3.4)). The optimal 
fraction of bond tax is then: 
(3.18) 
Tax revenue will then be used to cover the remaining fiscal deficit: 
(3.19) 
Replacing (3.18) and (3.19) into (3.1) and taking into account the future value of 
L2 (as given by (3.14)), the minimum loss is then given by: 
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(3.20) 
Comparing (3.17) with (3.20), the government does not like to renege on 
its short term debt in period 1 if: 
(3.21) 
where 
and 
f(R] *) describes a decreasing function of the shock on the international interest 
rate, while HI is not affected. The latter is constant in period 1 as is dependent on 
only predetermined variables. Default is therefore triggered by a shock high 
enough to bring the function f(R] *) below that constant. This is shown in Figure 
3.1. 
Solving (3.21) with respect to R/, gives the value of the threshold which 
trigger default option in period 1 (R in figure 3.1). 
(3.22) 
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Equation (3.22) is the analogous of the GDB from the previous chapter. As 
-
default option is trigged by shocks higher than R, GDB is inversely related to the 
probability of observing a partial default in period 1. To give a straightforward 
intuition of the features of the GDB curve we make use of graphical analysis. 
Figure 3.1 shows that when the HI is higher, the shock threshold moves leftwards 
and default probability grows. As HI is increasing in both short and long term 
interest rate, then the default trigger point is a decreasing function of the two 
interest rates. Moreover, GDB also declines for high stock of short and long term 
debt. The effect of the two kinds of bonds, however, is of different nature. Short 
term debt affects directly period 1 budget constraint and the financial needs to 
cover it. Long term bonds instead increase tomorrow budget and the size of future 
default, this in turn raises risk premium demanded by agents and thus the cost of 
borrowing for the government. The latter effect is somehow similar to that of a 
higher international interest rate. 
Structural parameters a and is, affect GDB in an intuitive way. A high is, 
makes the government concern more about next period fiscal deficit and thus 
more willing to anticipate a partial default. On the other hand, a high value of a 
means a high marginal cost of default and makes the government more reluctant 
to use it. 
It would be interesting to see how different allocations of the same initial 
amount of debt bo in short and long term bonds affect HI, and thus default 
probability. Unfortunately the exercise is quite complex, due to the effect of bd, 
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U=s, f) on its price. Keeping the two interest rates fixed, it is easy to show that 
moving bonds from short to long term maturity reduces HI and the probability of 
default occurring in period 1. In fact the partial derivative of HI wrt bas is higher 
than the derivative wrt b/ However when we look at the effect of bas on R/ and 
of bal on Ral , the former is lower than the latter and so the total effect of moving 
bonds from short to long maturity is ambiguous. Moreover, moving towards a 
longer maturity increases expected default size in the final period. 
3.2.4 Period 0 problem 
In the initial period, the stock of short and long term bonds is given, thus 
the government has no strategy to set. The private sector, however, is happy to 
hold public bonds only if compensated for the risk of default which may occur in 
the following two periods. We have seen above that default is a certain event in 
period 2, while it is not in period 1. However, optimal default size in period 2 
changes whether default occurred in period 1 or not. Thus, private investors have 
to formulate expectation on period 1 default probability in order to demand a fair 
premium on both kinds of bonds. 
The probability of observing default in period 1 is given by the density 
function of the shock on the world interest rate, and is equal to: 
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(3.23) 
otherwise 
where Re is the agents' evaluation of the default trigger point chosen by the 
government. Expected loss from default on short and long term debt is then 
respectively: 
(3.24) 
(3.25) 
where p, Bj , B/ and B/d are given respectively by (3.23), (3.l8), (3.l2) and (3.9). 
Replacing (3.24) and (3.25) into (3.6) and (3.7) respectively, and setting the 
expected world interest rate equal to its mean value (p+ v)/2, we get the interest 
rate set on short and long term bonds issued in the initial period: 
a - ~ a(a - 4 pb; ) 
R; = 2pb; if O<p~l 
1 if p=O 
I ak - ~ak(ak - eLL + vX4 -8(.u + v))bb) 
RO=----~~----2-k-b-,----------­
o 
-
and p being a decreasing function of R e as given by (3.23i. 
(3.26) 
(3.27) 
3 Note that to get (3.27) we have been using the optimal value of R/ and b/ from (3.15) and 
(3.16), where (3.16) has been replaced in (3.15) too. 
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-Equlibria are given by a triple (R , Ros, R/) such that they satisfy (3.24), 
-
(3.26) and (3.27) respectively with Re = R and with the corresponding values of 
Bj , B/ and (}/d all inside the interval [0, 1]. 
3.3 A Model with Default and Inflation 
3.3.1 The model 
The economy is the same as described in the previous section, but the 
government now has one more instrument of policy: inflation. The policymaker 
uses inflation in order to reduce the real value of the outstanding debt and thus the 
financial needs to cover the fiscal deficit. Inflation is allowed in both periods 1 
and 2, but unlike default it never involves exclusion from the credit market. 
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The introduction of the new instrument changes slightly the government's 
objective function and its budget constraints. Government intertemporal loss 
function is now given by4: 
(3.28) 
with (3.29) 
and the budget constraint in period 1 and 2 are equal to: 
(3.30) 
(3.31) 
and (3.5) still applies. Note that in the formulation of the above budget constraints 
we are neglecting the interaction effect of default and inflation on the debt 
burden5. The approximation allows the model to be analytically tractable, ignoring 
an effect of the second order. 
Private sector is still price setter in the domestic bond market and fixes the 
interest rate on public debt taking into account the expectations on future default 
and inflation. This gives the following expression for the interest rate on short and 
long term debt issued in different periods: 
(3.32) 
(3.33) 
4 The inflation index Zj is still defmed as in the previous chapter. 
5 The true budget constraint should, in fact, include a multiplicative effect (OJ zj)is such as in (2.25). 
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(3.34) 
where the usual assumptions on the density distribution of the random foreign 
interest rate still hold and Ro *=1. 
Following the same procedure as from the previous section, we need to 
solve the government's optimisation problem backwards. 
3.3.2 Period 2 
In the final period, the government can meet its budget constraint (3.31) 
using a combination of income taxes, partial default on outstanding debt and 
inflation. Assuming first that default did not occur in period 1, the minimisation of 
the loss function implies the following optimal values of the government's 
instruments: 
end 
b l RI +b S R S o 0 1 1 
2 (3.35) 
a 
nd 
Z2 
b l RI + bS R S o 0 1 1 (3.36) 
r 
which give a loss of 
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(3.37) 
In the alternative case that short tenn debt was not fully served in the 
previous period, optimal values are given by: 
blRI ()d 0 0 
2 
a 
(3.38) 
d b~R~ 
Z2=--
Y 
(3.39) 
d bl RI ay - (a + y)b~ R~ 
t2 = 0 0 +g2 
2ay 
with a corresponding a loss equal to: 
Ld _ blRI 2ay - (a + y )b~R~ 2 - 0 0 2ay (3.40) 
Note that expreSSIOns (3.35) and (3.38) for optimal default size are 
identical to those calculated in the model without inflation (see (3.9) and (3.12)). 
The reason lies in the absence of an interaction effect between default and 
inflation, which implies that the two instruments are set independently. The value 
of the loss function, however, is now lower as the possibility to inflate away part 
of the nominal bonds provides the policymaker with one more degree of freedom 
in setting its policy. 
As we saw in the previous section, as long as there are bonds coming due 
in period 2, the option to set ()2=O and/or Z2=O is never optimal. 
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3.3.3 Period 1 
In period 1, the government has the opportunity to cover part of its fiscal 
deficit issuing more short term bonds. As usual, this possibility is available only if 
it refrains from defaulting on debt maturing in that period. The decision between 
the two options depends on the cost of borrowing, which is set by private 
investors. The risk premium is now calculated taking into account future values of 
both default and inflation, as given by (3.35) and (3.36). The interest rate on 
newly issued bonds is then given by: 
RS _ ay-(a+y)b~R~ -~(ay-(a+y)b~R~) -4ay(a+y)btR; 
1 - 2(a + y)bt (3.41) 
If the government finds the above interest rate too high it will go for a 
partial default on the already issued bonds, otherwise will borrow new funds at 
that price. In both cases, income tax revenue and inflation will also be used to 
finance the budget deficit. The two alternatives provide the following outcomes 
(3.42)· 
and 
III one case; 
(3.43) 
and 
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in the other. 
In both cases, inflation will be set at the following level: 
(3.44) 
and income tax revenue is given as a residual from the budget constraint (3.30). 
Once agaIn, debt comIng due in period 1 will be completely repaid 
whenever 
Using (3.37), (3.40), (3.41), (3.42) and (3.43) to calculate the intertemporal 
loss function in the two cases, the above inequality can be express as: 
(3.45) 
where { J
2 bSR; 
H2 == y{a + y ( 0 )hI I 
ay- a+y o~ 
and 
wherej{RJ *) is identical to the rhs of(3.21) in the model with no inflation. 
Solving (3.45) for RJ * still gives the GDB curve: 
(3.46) 
100. 
m is still an increasing function of both short and long term interest rates and also 
grows for high stocks of debt issued in period o. Thus default threshold still 
enjoys the properties discussed in the previous section. 
3.3.4 Period 0 
Finally in the initial period agents set the interest rate on short and long 
term debt, formulating expectations on next periods policy. When they lend to the 
government for just one period, agents know that bonds will depreciate at a rate Zj 
and that there is a probability p (given by (3.23)) that they will get a further Bj % 
less at maturity. The interest rate that compensate holders against the total risk is 
then equal to: 
s ar - ~ar(ar - 4(a + pr)b~) Ro = ----.:....---;=------,------.:... 
2(a+ pr)b~ (3.47) 
On the other hand, long term investment implies a composite risk which 
involves: a depreciation rate Zj for the first period, an uncertain (usually different) 
depreciation rate for the second period and a final default risk of uncertain size. 
Moreover, investors face also uncertainty on the future shock on the international 
interest rate. Expectations on the total loss are given by: 
The interest rate the government has to pay on long term debt is given by: 
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11/, = Y(ak -(2 -&)b~R(, )-)Y'(ak -(2-&)b~R(,)' -4ar(a+y)h{2-&)bb 
2(a+r)kb~ 
where with k = 1 + p(l- 8(f.1 + v)/ 2) as in the previous section 
(3.48) 
x=(u+v)/2 IS the expected world interest rate In 
period 1, and Ros is given by (3.47) above. 
Equlibria are defined by a triple (R , Ros, Rol) such that they satisfy (3.46), 
-
(3.47) and (3.48) respectively with p given by (3.23) andRe = R, and with the 
inside the interval [0, 1]. 
As we discussed in prevIOUS chapter, in terms of Figure 2.3 the 
introduction of inflation in the model makes the reaction functions of the actors 
shifting up and rightwards. The final effect on the equilibrium then depends on the 
new position of the two curves. Here the GDB functions are given by (3.22) and 
(3.46) for cases without and with inflation respectively; while DIRL for these two 
cases are represented by equation (3.26) and (3.47)6. On the one hand, the 
availability of one more instrument of debt reduction would induce less use of 
default, for given interest rates (GDB shifts up); on the other hand, it induces a 
6 Note that referring to Figure 2.3 is not immediate as the GDB curve now depends on both short 
and long run interest rates. However as we are interested in default probability in period 1, we 
assume that the effect of long run interest rate is taken into account when drawing the GDB curve. 
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higher interest rate to compensate private agents for inflation risk, for any given 
default probability (DIRL moves rightwards). 
3.4 Default Probability in and out EMU 
Despite its complex analytical formulation, the model provides some 
straight intuitions in terms of possible consequences of giving up inflation as a 
tool of debt reduction. In particular, it suggests some indications on the role of the 
debt maturity structure in managing the default risk when moving from a regime 
of monetary sovereignty to one with exogenous monetary policy, such as the 
EMU. Moreover we are here able to give some analytical qualification of the 
results obtained throughout numerical simulations in the previous chapter. 
If we compare inequality (3.21) with (3.45) we see that they share the 
same rhs, while the lhs is different. The latter is represented by a constant line in 
Figure 3.1. In particular, Figure 3.1 suggests that pD~pD+I iif Hl"?H2 (where the 
superscripts D and D+I indicate the variables from the model with default only 
and that one with inflation respectively). This is because if the constant line HI is 
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higher, default threshold will be more leftwards and probability of default 
occurring higher. 
F . R s I or gIven 0 and Ro , we get that: 
Sign[HI- H2] = -Sign[a 2y - (a + YXb~R~Y] 
The sign of the squared brackets in rhs of above equation is positive iff: 
b'R' <a~ o 0 
a+r 
(3.49) 
The above inequality always holds. In fact we need 
b~R~ ~ a r in order to have R/ defined positivel/. 
a+y 
However, R/ and Rot will be typically different in the two regimes of 
monetary delegation and monetary sovereignty. It is possible to prove that the 
short tenn interest rate is always lower in the fonner regime. In fact, (R/)D+! is 
inversely related to the value of 1, so taking the limit of r going to infinity we can 
show that the minimum value for (R/)D+l is given by (Ros)D. So we have that: 
(3.50) 
(where equality is never reached but when r ~oo ) 
It is also possible to prove that 
(3.51) 
(all proofs are in the appendix) 
This straighten the positive difference between m and HI, and thus 
between pD+l and pD 8. Figure 3.2 describes the situation under both regimes. 
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The reason of the result is the same discussed in the previous chapter. 
Inflation pushes interest rates up, and increasing the cost of borrowing makes 
default more attractive. 
In fact, it is also easy to prove that 
(3.52) 
and consequently 
(3.53) 
However, we also have 
(3.54) 
This last relation together with (3.51) suggests that default size in the 
second period in the exogenous monetary policy regime may be higher or lower 
than in the full sovereignty regime (see equation (3.35)). While (3.51) implies that 
not only period 1 probability of default will be lower in the former regime, but 
also will be the size in the event default is occurring in that period (equation 
(3.42)). 
7 This is because E/+/[ Z2+ 02] E [0, 1] only ifthe inequality is satisfied. 
8 This proves the result that the default probability in period 1 declines when we .give up inflation. 
In the previous chapter we got the same result by mean of numerical analysis. The analytical prove 
is here possible thanks to two elements: a) the approximation (1-01)(1- Zl}~(1-0r ZI); b) allowing 
default in the final period, that generates an endogenous upperbound to the government's 
willingness to issue new debt even in the no-inflation case. Note that we are always assuming that 
short and long term bonds issued in the initial period are given at the same levels in the regimes. 
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It is also possible to prove that the ratio In/HI is increasing in the long 
term burden (hal ROI). This implies that the gain from joining EMU is higher for 
country with long term maturity debt. This is still due to the time inconsistency 
problem induced by inflation. Time inconsistency, in fact, is stronger with long 
term bonds (if they are not indexed). 
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Appendix 3 
Proof of (3.51): 
The long term interest rate in the model where default is allowed is given by 
equation (3.33) as: 
Eo[R;] Eo[R;] , 
:----=------''---- ~ == Ro (z \ = 0) = 
I-Eo[z\ +(}2 +Z2] I-Eo[(}2 +Z2] 
= ark-~ark(ark-(a+r)(,LL+vX4-8(,LL+v))b~) > R' D 
2(a + r)kb~ - ( 0) 
The above clrain of relations says that the long term interest rate can not 
increase if we assume no-inflation in period I. Given that, if Zl is assumed to be zero, 
replacing the risk premium and solving for ROI gives the last term of the chain. That 
expression describes a decreasing function in 1, which gets its minimum (as r ~oo) 
equal to (3.27), i.e. equal to the long term interest rate obtained in the D model 
(model with default only). 
Proof of (3 .52): 
Short term interest rate on period 1 bonds is given in the two regimes, D and 
D+I, by (3.15) and (3.41) respectively. Replacing the optimal values of (b/)D and 
(b/)D+I (given by (3.16) and (3.43)) the two short term interest rates are equal to: 
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N I . h d'f:C biD I D+! eg ectmg tel terence etween (Ra) and (Ra) and taking the difference 
between the above expressions it is straightforward to show that (3.52) holds. Taking 
into account (3.51) just strengthens the result. 
Proof of (3.53): 
Is immediate, just taking the difference between (3.16) and (3.43) with 
(R/)D=(R/)D+!, again when we consider that (R/)D~(Ral)D+! the difference is just 
bigger. 
Proof of (3.54) 
Multiplying the two above expressions of (R/)D and (R/)D+! for (3.16) and 
(3.43) respectively we get: 
(bSRS)D _ (a-b~(R~)DXl-8R;) 
1 1 - (2-8R;) 
(b S RS)D+l _ {ar - (a + r}b~ (R~)D+l Xl- 8R;) 
1 1 - (a + r Xi -8R; ) 
Once again to show that their difference is positive is immediate assuming 
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Chapter 4 
Default Risk Patterns in Europe: aD Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters we have presented two versions of a model where an 
optimising government had to manage a high public debt by having access to default 
and inflation as instruments of debt reduction. The main implication was that when 
government can tight its hands against inflation, the default risk also declines. The 
key assumption of the model is that default is triggered by high shocks on foreign 
interest rate. According to standard theory, with perfect capital mobility the 
borrowing cost for the government of a small open economy is driven by the foreign 
rate. Thus, an adverse shock on the latter may increase the borrowing cost to the point 
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that the social welfare improves more if the government opts for a partial default 
today rather than it raises a huge amount of distortionary tax revenue tomorrow. 
In this chapter, we are going to investigate further on the relationship which 
links domestic and foreign returns in a European context. Since early 80s, most of 
European countries have joint an exchange rate mechanism (ERM) and have agreed 
to eliminate controls on capital mobility. The result has been that Germany assumed 
the leadership in setting monetary policy and European returns on financial assets had 
to follow, in different degrees, the pattern of German interest rates. This, of course, 
has affected economic policy of other countries. 
One example of the leader role of German rates on other European economies 
IS given by the ERM crisis of 1992. After the inflationary pressure induced by 
Germany unification, German Central Bank tightened monetary policy increasing 
interest rates. The propagation effect to the other countries triggered the exchange 
rate crisis in Summer 1992, and induced a deep recession in Europe. The high interest 
rates had very negative effects in Italy were the risk of a debt crisis was a serious 
threat. The crisis was avoided implementing a strong fiscal restriction which reduced 
the primary deficit of almost 2% (actually a primary surplus emerged after many 
years of deficits). The fiscal manoeuvre, beyond its direct effect on budget, was 
meant to be a signal to the market about the government's commitment to invert the 
loose fiscal trend of the previous decade. 
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The episode made evident the fragility of debt sustainability to foreign interest 
rate! and made clear the need of structural fiscal reforms to reduce the high debt 
burden. At the light of our analysis, the event suggests not only that default risk may 
depend on foreign interest rate, but also that the relationship may be non-linear. That 
is, default risk may be zero or very small for low foreign interest rate, and then jump 
up when the foreign rate increases above a critical threshold2. 
In what follow, we are going to test the assumption that default risk premium 
incorporated in European public bond yields have a non linear relationship with the 
German interest rate. In particular, we want to investigate whether we can identify a 
threshold for the German rate above which default premium changes its pattern. 
The techniques adopted are those of the Threshold AutoRegressive (TAR) 
models, introduced by Tong (1978), Tong and Lim (1980) and Tong (1983). These 
models allow to study autoregressive processes that are linear within given regimes, 
where the regimes are determined by a threshold variable (the German rate in our 
case). TAR models have been used in forecasting analysis, especially when variables 
exhibit a cyclical component, such as GDP and industrial production series (see 
Clements and Krolzig, 1997; and Marrocu, 1998). A TAR application to interest rates 
is provided by Murto (1994), where the author uses the non-linear approach to study 
1 As we mentioned in chapter 1, the same fragility was responsible for the LDC debt crisis in the 80s. 
The rise in US interest rate charged indebted governments of an excessive debt service, pushing on an 
~nsustainable path sovereign debts which were sustainable at the previous interest rates. . .. . 
The argument finds some theoretical support. In fact, theory says that debt sustama~lhty !s 
guaranteed as long as real interest rate is below the real growth rate of the economy. A sudden Jump m 
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the dynamic of short term Finnish interest rates in 1987-1992. The author claims that: 
"non-linearity in the conditional mean is needed to describe the response of the 
interest process to exceptionally large shocks due to the speculative attacks" (p.7). In 
the papers just mentioned the threshold variable is always given by the lagged 
dependent variable itself. Our analysis departs from them in considering a different 
variable: the lagged German interest rate. 
Our investigation involves six European co.untries and Germany as the leader 
country, in a time span that goes from August 1991 to April 1998. Among the six 
countries, four are EMU members (Belgium, France, Italy and Spain) while two are 
not (Sweden and UK). 
A first step is to investigate on the existence of different regimes in the 
univariate autoregressive process of the default risk premium. Two regimes emerge 
quite clearly in all the countries where default premia appear significant. In a 
following section we introduce some macroeconomic variables to take into account 
their effect on expectations of the market in evaluating the risk premium. The 
evidence is that the explanatory variables, when significant, do not account for the 
different behaviour of the premium and the two regimes remain a robust result. 
real interest rate, especially when economic growth is low, can make current debt path unsustainable in 
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4.2 Methodology: a Non-Linear Approach 
In order to study the empirical relationship of default risk premIUm In 
European countries and the German interest rate, we take a non linear approach. The 
techniques adopted are those of the Threshold AutoRegressive (TAR) models. The 
basic idea of these models is that the underlying AR process of the variable under 
study is piecewise linear, where the kink points depend upon the value of a given 
'threshold' variable. As the threshold variable is continuous on 9l, partitioning the 
real line gives the number of possible regimes in which the process is divided. In 
particular, if Xt-d is the threshold variable (where tP-.O indicates time lagged order of 
the variable), the pth order linear AR process of the endogenous variable Yt in the /h 
regime is given by: 
11 + +1 +1 YI = a o + a l YI-I .•. a pYI-p &1 for r j_1 ::; x l _ d < rj j= 1, .... , N 
and with &ttIID(O, d) 
where N is the number of regimes and rj are known as thresholds. Of course the 
parameters al may vary across regimes as well as the AR order. 
the long run. A positive default risk emerges consequently. 
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4.3 The Data 
The data used for the analysis are risk premia on 10-years government bonds 
for six countries: Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, Sweden and UK; over a period from 
January 1991 (or as early as data are available) until November 1998. Following 
Favero, Giavazzi and Spaventa (1997), risk premia are calculated from the difference 
between bond yields spreads with respect to Germany and the exchange risk factors. 
The latters are obtained by the difference of swap contract rates denominated in 
domestic currency and in the German currencl. As suggested, we consider 
continuously compounded interest rates given by the logarithms of one plus the 
annual compounded rate. Data are weekly average over the respective daily 
observations. Weekly averages have the advantage to eliminate the intra-week 
'stagionality' . 
3 We are thankful to the Bank of Italy for the provision of the data-set. The original source of the data 
is as follows: returns from benchmark bonds are those published by IBS (International Bank of 
Settlements), while swap rates are those quoted daily by InterCapital Brokers in London from Reuters. 
Moreover, Datastream is the source of benchmark rates for Belgium and Sweden for the period 
07/0111991-25/07/1994, and for swap rates for Belgium (24/0611991-0610211995), Spain (22/07/1991-
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In the second part of the chapter, we make use of some macroeconomic 
variables to measure the effect of the main economic and fiscal indicators on the 
default risk premium. Among the main economic indicators we consider: inflation 
rate, industrial production index (lIP), change in the industrial production index, 
change in GOP, unemployment rate; while fiscal variables are: total deficit to GOP 
ratio, debt to GOP ratio, and a measure of the fiscal pressure as percentage of GOP. 
Inflation (calculated on CPI), lIP, change in lIP and unemployment are monthly data, 
while change in GOP are quarterly and all the fiscal variables are annual data4. To 
match the weekly frequency of the risk premium we have calculated series where 
each observation is repeated as many weeks as needed to cover the time span of the 
higher frequency variable. 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the total spreads and the exchange risk component 
respectively, for the six countries. It is immediate to see that the exchange risk factor 
accounts almost completely for the total spread: the two figures show a very similar 
pattern and the magnitude is appreciably different only in the case of Italy. Figure 4.3 
illustrates the default risk premium. The default risk component is mostly zero or 
negative for Sweden and positive only in very short periods in the case of UK. The 
France picture shows an initial period of negative premium, which turns suddenly 
30/0111995) and Sweden (07/06/1992-06/02/1995) for the periods in brackets. The integration was 
needed as the original data were not available. 
4 Source of the data: CPI and unemployment are OCSE series, while lIP and change in GD~ ~re 
Eurostat series; all fiscal variables are published by the Bank of Italy in the "Public Finance StatiStics 
in the European Union" - Statistical Bulletin Supplements (17 February 1999). 
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positive in November 1993, and that drops to negligible values in March 1996. A 
possible explanation rely on our measure of the default premium as residual between 
the total yield differential and the exchange rate factor: in fact, the negative premium 
may be due to the overestimation of the exchange risk in the swap market in the 
period 1991-93 with repeated speculative attacks against the French franc. Finally a 
significant default risk component is evident in for Italy, Belgium and Spain. The 
premium is very small but positive (around 0.25%) for the last two countries and 
definitely higher for Italy (with picks up to 1.5%). Moreover, Italian premium appears 
quite persistent with respect to the other two countries. 
4.4 The TAR Analysis 
In this section we move to investigate the behaviour of the default risk 
premium, looking for possible regimes driven by the German interest rate. As we 
have discussed in the previous section, from a first look at the data a positive default 
premium emerges for Belgium, Italy and Spain, while Sweden and UK do not seem to 
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exhibit any significant default risk and France shows evidence of it only in the period 
November 1993-March 1996. Moreover, the France picture suggests that the 
premium has a stable pattern around its mean in the above mentioned period, which 
then drops suddenly to a approximately zero value. Therefore we think that a simple 
additive structural break can explain the pattern better than a TAR analysis. 
As we are interested in the possibility of different regimes related to the 
German rate, we focus our analysis on Belgium, Italy and Spain only. The time 
period considered is August 1991-April 1998, the reduced time span being due to 
some missing data. 
The first step is to identifying, for each country, a candidate value of the 
German interest rate to act as a threshold. That is, for each country, we are going to 
investigate if it does exist a value of the German rate such that the behaviour of the 
default risk shows significantly different patterns in the two regimes determined by 
the threshold. To this aim univariate AR regressions have been run for all the possible 
threshold values and the best TAR model has been chosen on the base of the AlC 
information criterion5• The exercise has been repeated for each of the three countries. 
As threshold variable we have used the German interest rate lagged of 1 period6. The 
best AR order was still selected with the AlC criterion over a range between 1 and 6 
lags. 
5 Iterative regressions using all the possible thresholds have been run with TSP package. 
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Once structural parameters, rand p, are known, a TAR model can be 
estimated. The set up of the model implies the construction of an indicator function to 
take into account of the two regimes. An F-test is then implemented to check for non-
redundancy of the regimes 7. 
Results are presented In table 4.1. Beyond equations estimated with the 
indicator function, AR models for the two separate regimes are included. This allows 
for more intuitive insights of the default behaviour in the different regimes. Regime a 
correspond to high German rates, while regime b is the low rates regime. 
The F-test on the assumption of a unique regime is strongly rejected for all 
countries. In the Italian case, the constant term appears significantly higher in the a 
regime than in the b one, suggesting ajump in the value of the risk premium when the 
German rate is above the threshold. Moreover, the regime b seems largely more 
persistent. For the other two countries the increase of the constant term is marginal 
and the regime switching seems to affect mostly the AR process. 
For Belgian and Spanish regressions, diagnostic tests show that estimations 
are quite accurate and only normatily problems emerge8. However, heteroscedasticity 
is also evident in the Italian case, possibly indicating the omission of some ARCH or 
GARCH structure of the default premium. 
6 Lagged German rate was required as the current value enters the construction of the default risk 
premium. Moreover, it is sensible to allow a short, but not zero, period of time to the risk premium to 
react to the foreign rate. 
7 Basically we are testing for all coefficients of the variables multiplied by the indicator function to be 
zero. 
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Given by the high persistence in the Italian premium series (evident also from 
Figure 4.3), the exercise has been repeated on the variable in first difference. The 
threshold value results stable and the two regimes appear a robust result9 (see table 
4.2). 
Finally, Figure 4.3 shows that all the default risk series share a high pick on 
the 22nd of February 1993. The possibility that the outlier affects the threshold value 
is therefore investigated. The TAR analysis is then conducted introducing an impulse 
dummy to model the pick. The introduction of the impulse dummy suggests a higher 
threshold value for Belgium and Spain and affects the dynamics of the risk premium: 
a higher AR order is required for both countries. But the presence of the two regimes 
is still highly evident. The introduction of the dummy does not seem to affect at all 
the Italian analysis, which still shows the same value of the threshold and the same 
dynamic pattern. This is because the outlier was not really relevant in the Italian case. 
However the diagnostic testing of the models show that the dummy variable worsen 
the reliability of the estimation importing autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity 
where they were absent before. So we decided to neglect the impulse dummy in the 
estimates. We conclude that two regimes are evident for the risk premium of 
8 Given the high number of tests implemented in the estimations, 1% level of confidence is choosen. 
9 TAR models in first difference are estimated also for Belgium and Spain. Results are consistent with 
the analysis in levels. The Spanish series in first difference however exhibits a long AR process 
suggesting that moving average elements have been introduced and first difference were not 
appropriate. 
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Belgium, Italy and Spain, but some uncertainty remains on the 'true' value of the 
threshold in the Spanish and Belgian case. 
4.5 The Role of Economic and Fiscal Indicators 
The next step is that to investigate whether the regime-pattern of the default 
risk premia emerged in the previous section can be accounted for by including in the 
TAR models some relevant economic and fiscal indicators. Thus, we look for the best 
set of variables to describe the default risk pattern choosing from the available set and 
testing for those which are not significant. German main economic indicators are 
included as well to measure whether the state of the economy of the leader country 
has any effect on the premium of the 'followers countries'. As we are interested in 
catching the effect incorporated into the financial operators' expectations, 
macroeconomic variables are introduced lagged to the time of the actual information 
delivery. We also test for an announcement effect. To measure this effect, we 
introduce a dummy variable where each observation enters only the week the 
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information IS delivered JO • Table 4.4 provides a list of variables included In the 
regressIOns. 
Given the low frequency of the fiscal variables only one of them has been 
introduced in each model. The best candidate was chosen on the base of its 
performance in the model (in terms of significance, correct sign, diagnostic testing 
and AIC criterion). 
TAR estimations of the most successful models are showed in table 4.3. The 
main result is that the two regimes remain evident and stable. The identified threshold 
values are slightly higher, but still very close, to the ones obtained in the univariate 
process. The F-test of unique regime is still strongly rejected. 
Explanatory macroeconomics variables seem to add little information to the 
simple TAR models ll . This is also indicated by the AIC criterion, which improves 
only marginally. Moreover, most variables show an unstable relationship with the risk 
premium, as their sign changes between the two regimes. 
The announcement effect is seldom significant, but when it is, it seems to 
incorporate the total effect of the variable (i.e. the effect of the variable along the 
period up to the next information delivery vanishes). 
10 The delivery timetable of the Eurostat data has been provided by the data-shop oflST AT, the Italian 
Institution of National Statistics. Information on date delivery of the fiscal variables ofItalian as well 
as of other European countries has been provided by the Bank of Italy. 
II Moreover, the introduction of such variables worsen markedly the performance of the estimations in 
terms of diagnostic testing 
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Among the fiscal indicators, the degree of fiscal pressure appears the most 
powerful explanatory variable for Italy and Spain. The effects of the variable are, 
however, quite different in the two countries. In Italy an increase in the fiscal pressure 
has a positive effect on the debt sustainability in both regimes. This indicates that a 
higher fiscal pressure is understood as rigorous fiscal policy. On the other hand, high 
fiscal pressure has an adverse effect on Spanish risk premium in the low rate regime. 
This may suggests that in Spain fiscal pressure is perceived as too high and can not be 
raised further without depressing effects on the economy and bad consequences on 
the debt service. Belgian risk premium, instead, appears more sensitive to the deficit 
to GDP ratio, but the variable is significant only in the low rate regime. 
The introduction of the German variables suggests interesting considerations. 
In the Italian and Spanish models, the leader economy seems to affect default risk 
only in the b regime, which is the low rate regime. The evidence is shared also by 
Belgium but in lower extent. As the low rate regime seems to prevail in the most 
recent period of economic convergence the result may indicate that the closer we get 
to the single currency the more German variables incorporate all the relevant 
information. 
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Conclusions 
The thesis aims to provide a contribution to the literature of public debt 
management and sustainability. In particular, we focus on the interaction between default 
and inflation risk on public debt bonds to shed light on default risk behaviour with and 
without monetary sovereignty. 
From a practical point of view, the topic is quite relevant for the new economic 
environment of Europe: EMU had its full operating start just few months ago including 
Member States with very different public finance soundness. Countries with low and long 
maturity public debt are now sharing a single currency with others burdened by high debt 
(even higher than 100% of GOP) and often of short maturity, all giving up their monetary 
sovereignty to appoint it to an independent institution, the European Central Bank. In the 
recent years, a lively debate took place on feasibility of such an agreement. Many 
economists have been arguing on the importance of monetary sovereignty in avoiding 
debt crises, as monetisation is a last resort to repay bonds. If this escape option is 
eliminated, what are the implications on bond yields for high debt countries? What about 
default probability on sovereign debt? Will the exchange rate uncertainty be replaced by 
more financial uncertainty? 
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In the present work we have attempted to provide some answers to the above 
questions. 
The first step has been to look at the state of the art presenting and discussing the 
main literature on sovereign default. In particular we have identified two branches of the 
literature on the topic, one focusing on foreign debt the other on domestic debt. In the 
former kind of analysis, the main implication of the default threat is the existence of 
credit rationing for indebted countries, which limits their ability to borrow and thus their 
incentive to default. In a world without uncertainty, the credit ceiling implies that default 
never occurs. In the latter stream of studies, instead, when debt burden is high, creditors 
are willing to hold public bonds only for higher and higher yields, increasing the 
government's incentive to default. Default on domestic bonds shows self-fulfilling 
properties with multiple equilibria, where expectations assume a crucial role. In this 
contest, the probability of a confident crisis appears to decrease with debt maturity and 
with a more uniform distribution of bonds maturity structure. 
Moreover, empirical analysis suggests that a default risk premium is actually 
incorporated in public bond yields for those countries with high debt burden and a past of 
weak fiscal discipline. 
Next step has been to develop a theoretical model, where an optimising 
government, acting in a stochastic environment, has the option of defaulting on public 
debt. The optimal policy is 'state contingent' and partial default may occur in the bad 
states of the world. The model can show multiple equilibria, which correspond to 
different default probabilities and initial interest rates. 
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How does the model change when inflation is included among the government's 
instruments of debt reduction? Surprisingly, simulations suggest that the default risk is 
higher. The intuition is that inflation is partially anticipated and raises domestic interest 
rates, worsening the debt service burden which in tum induces higher inflation: the 
increasing costs of inflation make default more attractive. So excluding inflation reduces 
the default risk. 
The analysis implies that the loss of monetary sovereignty following the start of 
the EMU brings a high credibility gain. This high credibility seems to more than 
compensate for the loss of flexibility in facing stochastic shocks. Our results are 
consistent with observed market expectations as incorporated in the declining path of 
yield spreads on European public bonds since the EMU regime was approaching. The 
patter of declining differentials became even more pronounced when EMU actually 
started. 
The main result, however, fails to hold when inflation is used only to surprise the 
market. 
Thirdly, we moved to investigate further the theoretical analysis. In chapter 3, we 
present a new version of the model, where few simplifications allow us to prove 
analytically the results. Moreover, the explicit consideration of short and long maturity 
bonds enriches the analysis with some intuitions on debt management strategy. The 
model shows that the gain from joining EMU, in terms of reduced default probability, 
increases with debt maturity. In fact, long maturity bonds represent a strong incentive to 
monetise debt, inducing private investors to ask for a high inflation premium. The interest 
rate saving, which follows from the loss of monetary sovereignty, is therefore higher with 
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long term bonds than with short term ones. This result is consistent with Uhlig (1996), 
where high inflationary governments may be tempted to issue long term bonds in order to 
obtain political consensus in joining the single currency regime. 
Last step has been to present an empirical analysis to investigate on the 
relationship between default risk and foreign interest rate realisations, which is the trigger 
device of our theoretical model. In the last chapter, we study the interaction of default 
premium with the interest rate of a foreign country, which acts as price leader in the bond 
market (Germany in our case). Our analysis suggests that default risk has a non-linear 
relation with the foreign yield. In particular, we have identified a threshold value for the 
German rate above which default premium on government bonds (for Belgium, Italy and 
Spain) changes its pattern exhibiting an increased mean. We also found that this different 
reaction of default premium to foreign yield cannot be accounted for by domestic fiscal 
policy and/or other macroeconomic indicators. Finally, not only does Italian default 
premium appear higher than in the other two countries, but it is also more persistent. This 
is in line with the empirical literature discussed in chapter 1. 
Summing up, our work indicates that EMU itself can not make Member States' 
debt sustainability riskier; whilst it suggests that credibility gain is the main factor in 
reducing debt serving burden, as observed in European countries. On the other hand, the 
underlying risk is that a lower borrowing cost may induce governments to relax on fiscal 
discipline; this is a topic faced by the Stability Pact and is beyond the aim of our analysis. 
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Table 4.1 Autoregressive Models 
Belgium 
EQ( Ai) Modelling RP _be by OLS (using ISBar2PCG.xls) 
The present sample is: 3 to 347 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-value t-prob HCSE 
Constant 0,00022017 9,18E-05 2,4 0,017 6,65E-05 
RP _bei 0,98316 0,10193 9,645 0 0,093857 
RP_be2 -0,14525 0,084363 -1,722 0,086 0,064925 
d(6.528) 0,00020191 0,00013517 1,494 0,1362 0,00016444 
dRP _bei -0,44508 0,1197 -3,718 0,0002 0,19572 
dRP _be2 0,40659 0,10882 3,736 0,0002 0,17858 
RJ\2 = 0.681327 F(5,339) = 144.96 [0.0000] \sigma = 0.000427257 OW = 2.03 
RSS = 6.18840612ge-005 for 6 variables and 345 observations 
Information Criteria: 
SC = -15.4322 HQ = -15.4724 FPE=1.85724e-007 AIC = -15.499 
AR 1- 2 F( 2,337) = 
ARCH 1 F( 1,337) = 
Normality ChiJ\2(2)= 
XiJ\2 F( 9,329) = 
Xi*Xj F(11,327) = 
RESET F( 1,338) = 
0.95355 [0.3864] 
3.6594 [0.0566] 
218.56 [0.0000] ** 
1.0081 [0.4332] 
0.88033 [0.5600] 
2.4246 [0.1204] 
Wald test for linear restrictions: Subset 
LinRes F( 3,339) = 8.5467 [0.0000] ** 
Zero restrictions on: 
d(6.528) dRP _bei dRP _be2 
2 regimes 
~gime a - for high German interest rate 
e present sample is: 3 to 183 
riable 
Instant 
'_be_a1 
'_be_a2 
Coefficient 
0,00042208 
0,53808 
0,26134 
Std.Error 
0,00012335 
0,077984 
0,085426 
t-value 
3,422 
6,9 
3,059 
egime b - for low German interest rate 
le presen t sample is: 184 to 347 
lriable 
)nstant 
) _be_b1 
) _be_b2 
=6.528 
Coefficient 
0,00022017 
0,98316 
-0,14525 
LnRes F( 3,339) = 
Std.Error 
5,79E-05 
0,064317 
0,053231 
t-value 
3,803 
15,286 
-2,729 
8.5467 [0.0000] ** 
t-prob 
0,0008 
o 
0,0026 
t-prob 
0,0002 
o 
0,0071 
HCSE 
0,00015034 
0,17167 
0,16629 
HCSE 
6,65E-05 
0,0939 
0,064955 
Italy 
EQ( A2) Modelling RP _it by OLS (using ISBar2PCG.xls) 
The present sample is: 4 to 347 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-value t-prob HCSE 
Constant 1,64E-05 7,71E-05 0,213 0,8318 5,33E-05 
RP _it1 1,1676 0,066528 17,55 0 0,1327 
RP _it2 -0,32959 0,10049 -3,28 0,0011 0,13273 
RP_it3 0,14084 0,066032 2,133 0,0337 0,071515 
d(7.0585) 0,00079512 0,00025313 3,141 0,0018 0,00048484 
dRP _it1 -0,30205 0,11287 -2,676 0,0078 0,19006 
dRP _it2 0,34796 0,15773 2,206 0,0281 0,1747 
dRP _it3 -0,096982 0,11118 -0,872 0,3837 0,10488 
RA2 = 0.970349 F(7,336) = 1570.8 [0.0000] \sigma = 0.000751611 DW = 2.04 
RSS = 0.0001898126669 for 8 variables and 344 observations 
Information Criteria: 
SC = -14.2743 HQ = -14.328 FPE=5.78056e-007 AIC = -14.3636 
AR 1- 2 F( 2,334) = 
ARCH 1 F( 1,334) = 
Normality ChiA2(2)= 
XiA2 F(13,322) = 
Xi*Xj F(19,316) = 
RESET F( 1,335) = 
2.7315 [0.0666] 
39.298 [0.0000] ** 
187.24 [0.0000] ** 
7.5344 [0.0000] ** 
6.4111 [0.0000] ** 
0.41904 [0.5179] 
Wald test for linear restrictions: Subset 
LinRes F( 4,336) = 5.9932 [0.0001] ** 
Zero restrictions on: 
d(7.0585) dRP _it1 dRP _it2 dRP _it3 
2 regimes 
Regime a - for high German interest rate 
The present sample is: 4 to 112 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-value 
Constant 0,00081152 0,00025422 3,192 
RP _it_1a 0,8655 0,096145 9,002 
RP _it_2a 0,018368 0,12819 0,143 
RP _it_3a 0,043861 0,094324 0,465 
Regime b - for low German interest rate 
The present sample is: 113 to 347 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-value 
Constant 1,64E-05 7,52E-05 0,218 
RP _it_1b 1,1676 0,064814 18,014 
RP _it_2b -0,32959 0,0979 -3,367 
RP _it_3b 0,14084 0,064331 2,189 
r=7.0585 
LinRes F( 4,336) = 5.9932 [0.0001] ** 
t-prob HCSE 
0,0019 0,00048525 
° 
0,137 
0,8863 0,11438 
0,6429 0,07725 
t-prob HCSE 
0,8275 5,32E-05 
° 
0,13228 
0,0009 0,13231 
0,0296 0,071288 
Spain 
EQ( A3) Modelling RP _sp by OLS (using ISBar2PCG.xls) 
The present sample is: 3 to 347 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-value t-prob HCSE 
Constant 0,00018802 0,00011839 1,588 0,1132 7,67E-05 
RP _sp1 1,0812 0,11027 9,805 0 0,12523 
RP _sp2 -0,17853 0,10504 -1,7 0,0901 0,11729 
d(6.5940) 0,00017919 0,00014101 1,271 0,2047 0,00013306 
dRP _sp1 -0,54487 0,12519 -4,352 
° 
0,16868 
dRP _sp2 0,36458 0,12227 2,982 0,0031 0,16021 
RA2 = 0.650759 F(5,339) = 126.34 [0.0000] \sigma = 0.000557804 DW = 2.02 
RSS = 0.0001054782637 for 6 variables and 345 observations 
Information Criteria: 
SC = -14.8989 HQ = -14.9391 FPE=3.16557e-007 AIC = -14.9658 
AR 1- 2 F( 2,337) = 
ARCH 1 F( 1,337) = 
Normality ChiA2(2)= 
XiA2 F( 9,329) = 
Xi*Xj F(11 ,327) = 
RESET F( 1,338) = 
0.36721 [0.6929] 
6.4938 [0.0113] * 
218.51 [0.0000] ** 
1.8541 [0.0581] 
2.0586 [0.0229] * 
5.2885 [0.0221] * 
Wald test for linear restrictions: Subset 
LinRes F( 3,339) = 7.8098 [0.0000] ** 
Zero restrictions on: 
d(6.5940) dRP _sp1 dRP _sp2 
2 regimes 
Regime a - for high German interest rate 
The present sample is: 3 to 166 
Variable 
Constant 
RP _sp_a1 
RP _sp_a2 
Coefficient 
0,00036722 
0,53636 
0,18605 
Std.Error 
0,00010217 
0,079073 
0,083486 
t-value 
3,594 
6,783 
2,229 
Regime b - for low German interest rate 
The present sample is: 167 to 347 
Variable 
Constant 
RP_sp_b1 
RP_sp.:...b2 
r=6.S94 
Coefficient 
0,00018802 
1,0812 
-0,17853 
LinRes F( 3,339) = 
Std.Error 
6,43E-05 
0,059908 
0,057069 
t-value 
2,923 
18,048 
-3,128 
7.8098 [0.0000] ** 
t-prob 
0,0004 
° 0,0272 
t-prob 
0,0039 
° 0,0021 
HCSE 
0,00010876 
0,11306 
0,10918 
HCSE 
7,67E-05 
0,12518 
0,11724 
Table 4.2 Autoregressive Models 
(first differences) 
Italy 
EQ(D1) Modelling DRP _it by OLS (using ITar2-fdPCG.xls) 
The present sample is: 3 to 346 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-value t-prob 
Constant -9,51 E-05 5,02E-05 -1,894 0,0591 
DRP _it1 0,1837 0,066838 2,748 0,0063 
DRP _it2 -0,14792 0,066565 -2,222 0,0269 
d(7.0624) 0,00027624 9,07E-05 3,046 0,0025 
dDRP _it1 -0,26506 0,11236 -2,359 0,0189 
dDRP _it2 0,089671 0,11254 0,797 0,4261 
HCSE 
5,41 E-05 
0,13035 
0,072099 
0,00010304 
0,18064 
0,1067 
R"2 = 0.0575523 F(5,338) = 4.1281 [0.0012] \sigma = 0.000761874 OW = 2.02 
RSS = 0.0001961928673 for 6 variables and 344 observations 
Information Criteria: 
SC = -14.2752 HQ = -14.3155 FPE=5.90576e-007 AIC = -14.3422 
AR 1- 2 F( 2,336) = 
ARCH 1 F( 1,336) = 
Normality Chi"2(2)= 
Xi"2 F( 9,328) = 
Xi*Xj F(11 ,326) = 
RESET F( 1,337) = 
1.34 [0.2632] 
26.534 [0.0000] ** 
214.04 [0.0000] ** 
5.9914 [0.0000] ** 
5.5811 [0.0000] ** 
0.0080815 [0.9284] 
Wald test for linear restrictions: Subset 
LinRes F( 3,338) = 4.9106 [0.0024) ** 
Zero restrictions on: 
d(7.0624) dDRP _it1 dDRP _it2 
2 regimes 
Regime a - for high German interest rate 
The present sample is: 3 to 110 
Variable 
Constant 
DRP _it_a 1 
DRP _it_a2 
Coefficient 
0,00018117 
-0,081167 
-0,058592 
Std.Error 
8,10E-05 
0,096936 
0,09739 
t-value 
2,235 
-0,837 
-0,602 
Regime b - for low German interest rate 
The present sample is: 111 to 346 
Variable 
Constant 
DRP_iCb1 
DRP _it_b2 
r=7.0624 
Coefficient 
-9,51 E-05 
0,18378 
-0,14791 
LinRes F( 3,338) = 
Std.Error 
4,85E-05 
0,064509 
0,064246 
t-value 
-1,962 
2,849 
-2,302 
4.9106 [0.0024] ** 
t-prob 
0,0275 
0,4043 
0,5487 
t-prob 
0,0509 
0,0048 
0,0222 
HCSE 
8,81 E-05 
0,12558 
0,079115 
HCSE 
5,40E-05 
0,13001 
0,071879 
Table 4.3 Autoregressive Models 
with Macro Variables 
Belgium 
EQ(M1) Modelling RP(BE) by OLS (using bea1.xls) 
The present sample is: 2 to 347 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-value t-prob 
Constant -0,0026674 0,0014259 -1,871 0,0623 
RP1 0,55449 0,063513 8,73 
° DIIP(BE) -4,88E-06 7,25E-06 -0,674 0,501 
UnA(BE) -8,19E-06 7,58E-06 -1,08 0,2807 
Un(BE) 0,0001247 0,0001275 0,978 0,3287 
def(BE) 0,00026486 9,02E-05 2,936 0,0036 
Infl(GR) -0,017114 0,011328 -1,511 0,1318 
DIIP(GR) 4,72E-06 2,47E-05 0,191 0,8488 
Un(GR) 0,00014488 7,18E-05 2,018 0,0444 
d(6.63224) 0,0024082 0,0015543 1,549 0,1223 
dRP1 0,22099 0,079429 2,782 0,0057 
dDIIP(BE) -3,60E-05 1,50E-05 -2,391 0,0174 
dUnA(BE) -1,44E-05 1,19E-05 -1,216 0,2247 
dUn(BE) 0,00017428 0,00021991 0,793 0,4286 
ddef(BE) -0,0003517 0,00010686 -3,291 0,0011 
dlnfl(GR) 0,032152 0,01289 2,494 0,0131 
dDIIP(GR) -0,0001439 4,96E-05 -2,904 0,0039 
dUn(GR) -0,0003807 0,00025505 -1,493 0,1365 
HCSE 
0,001153 
0,12368 
4,81E-06 
4,99E-06 
9,10E-05 
0,00010254 
0,01014 
1,41 E-05 
6,58E-05 
0,0013013 
0,14125 
3,45E-05 
1,18E-05 
0,0002604 
0,00011703 
0,013991 
0,0001084 
0,00025617 
RA2 = 0.717889 F(17,328) = 49.098 [0.0000] \sigma = 0.000408697 OW = 2.04 
RSS = 5.478689451e-005 for 18 variables and 346 observations 
Information Criteria: 
SC = -15.3543 HQ = -15.4748 FPE=1.75723e-007 AIC = -15.5545 
AR 1- 2 F( 2,326) = 
ARCH 1 F( 1,326) = 
Normality ChiA2(2)= 
XiA2 F(33,294) = 
RESET F( 1,327) = 
0.64687 [0.5244] 
2.6603 [0.1038] 
201.37 [0.0000] ** 
1.8637 [0.0038] ** 
2.4972 [0.1150] 
Wald test for linear restrictions: Subset 
LinRes F( 9,328) = 5.8239 [0.0000] ** 
Zero restrictions on: 
d(6.63224) dRP1 dDIIP(BE) dUn1 (BE) dUn(BE) ddef(BE) dlnfl(GR) dDIIP(GR) dUn(GR) 
2 regimes 
Regime a - for high German interest rate 
The present sample is:2 to 161 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-value 
Constant -0,0002592 0,00076737 
-0,338 
RP1_a 0,77548 0,059148 13,111 
OIlP(BELa -4,085E-05 0,000016351 -2,498 
UnA(BELa -2,261E-05 0,000011298 -2,001 
Un(BELa 0,00029898 0,00022219 1,346 
def(BELa -8,68E-05 0,000071036 -1,222 
Infl(GRLa 0,015038 0,0076259 1,972 
OIlP(GRLa -0,0001392 0,000053255 -2,614 
Un(GRLa -0,0002358 0,00030349 -0,777 
Regime b - for low German interest rate 
The present sample is:162 to 347 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-value 
Constant -0,0026674 0,0010489 -2,543 
RP1 b 0,55449 0,046724 11,867 
OIlP(BELb -4,882E-06 5,3308E-06 -0,916 
UnA(BELb -8,19E-06 5,5763E-06 -1,469 
Un(BELb 0,0001247 0,000093793 1,33 
def(BELb 0,00026486 0,000066361 3,991 
Infl(GRLb -0,017114 0,0083336 -2,054 
OIlP(GRLb 4,7207E-06 0,000018198 0,259 
Un(GRLb 0,00014488 0,000052822 2,743 
r=6.63224 
LinRes F( 9,328) = 5.8239 [0.0000] ** 
t-prob HCSE 
0,736 0,00060475 
0 0,068367 
0,0135 3,4207E-05 
0,0472 1,0757E-05 
0,1804 0,00024454 
0,2237 5,6545E-05 
0,0504 0,0096619 
0,0099 0,00010772 
0,4383 0,00024812 
t-prob HCSE 
0,0119 0,0011508 
0 0,12345 
0,361 4,8019E-06 
0,1437 4,9789E-06 
0,1854 9,0805E-05 
0,0001 0,00010234 
0,0415 0,010121 
0,7956 0,00001408 
0,0067 0,00006571 
Italy 
EQ(M2) Modelling RP(IT) by OLS (using ita1.xls) 
The present sample is: 4 to 347 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-value t-prob HCSE 
Constant -0,0011216 0,0043025 -0,261 0,7945 0,002977 
RP1 1,0647 0,065623 16,224 
° 
0,12656 
RP2 -0,27675 0,095135 -2,909 0,0039 0,11859 
RP3 0,079853 0,06457 1,237 0,2171 0,069343 
InfIA(IT) -0,0072886 0,0027751 -2,626 0,009 0,0026884 
Infl(IT) 0,0017394 0,0099447 0,175 0,8613 0,0093136 
IIP(IT) 2,91 E-05 2,11 E-05 1,383 0,1677 2,00E-05 
fp(IT) -0,0001499 6,81E-05 -2,202 0,0284 6,33E-05 
Infl(GR) 0,034386 0,010787 3,188 0,0016 0,010701 
IIP(GR) 9,70E-05 3,68E-05 2,635 0,0088 4,25E-05 
Un(GR) -0,0006065 0,00019573 -3,099 0,0021 0,00022086 
d(7.0868) 0,013979 0,0091597 1,526 0,128 0,0081164 
dRP1 -0,35313 0,1134 -3,114 0,002 0,19493 
dRP2 0,30612 0,15042 2,035 0,0427 0,16497 
dRP3 0,068167 0,11108 0,614 0,5399 0,11176 
dlnfIA(IT) 0,0089321 0,0043451 2,056 0,0406 0,0039906 
dlnfl(IT) -0,076192 0,047008 -1,621 0,106 0,04561 
dIlP(IT) 0,00010601 4,15E-05 2,556 0,011 5,35E-05 
dfp(IT) -0,0003945 0,00018465 -2,137 0,0334 0,00016777 
dlnfl(GR) -0,033 0,014377 -2,295 0,0224 0,01401 
dIlP(GR) -9,51 E-05 9,47E-05 -1,004 0,3161 9,71E-05 
dUn(GR) 0,00081471 0,00047294 1,723 0,0859 0,00036792 
RJ\2 = 0.974663 F(21 ,322) = 589.85 [0.0000] \sigma = 0.000709721 OW = 2.08 
RSS = 0.0001621927084 for 22 variables and 344 observations 
Information Criteria: 
SC = -14.1938 HQ = -14.3416 FPE=5.35918e-007 AIC = -14.4395 
AR 1- 2 F( 2,320) = 
ARCH 1 F( 1,320) = 
Normality ChiJ\2(2)= 
XiJ\2 F(41 ,280) = 
RESET F( 1,321) = 
4.0338 [0.0186] * 
44.627 [0.0000] ** 
152.5 [0.0000] ** 
4.8859 [0.0000] ** 
2.504 [0.1145] 
Wald test for linear restrictions: Subset 
LinRes F(11,322) = 5.3039 [0.0000] ** 
Zero restrictions on: 
d(7.0868) dRP1 dRP2 dRP3 dlnfI1(IT) dlnfl(IT) dIlP(IT) dfp(IT) dlnfl(GR) dIlP(GR) dUn(GR) 
2 regimes 
Regime a - for high German interest rate 
The present sample is:4 to 110 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-value 
Constant 0,012857 0,0084903 1,514 
RP1_a 0,71153 0,097098 7,328 
RP2_a 0,029366 0,12234 0,24 
RP3_a 0,14802 0,0949 1,56 
InfIA(ITLa 0,0016435 0,0035104 0,468 
Infl(ITLa -0,074452 0,04824 -1,543 
IIP(ITLa 0,00013512 0,000037519 3,601 
fp(ITLa -0,0005444 0,00018022 -3,021 
Infl(GRLa 0,0013864 0,009979 0,139 
IIP(GRLa 1,9268E-06 0,0000916 0,021 
Un(GRLa 0,00020819 0,00045204 0,461 
Regime b - for low German interest rate 
The present sample is:lll to 347 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-value 
Constant -0,0011216 0,0042079 -0,267 
RP1 b 1,0647 0,06418 16,589 
RP2_b -0,27675 0,093043 -2,974 
RP3_b 0,079853 0,06315 1,264 
InfIA(ITLb -0,0072886 0,0027141 -2,685 
Infl(ITLb 0,0017394 0,009726 0,179 
IIP(ITLb 0,00002911 0,000020589 1,414 
fp(ITLb -0,0001499 0,000066565 -2,252 
Infl(GRLb 0,034386 0,01055 3,259 
IIP(GRLb 9,7013E-05 0,000036013 2,694 
Un(GRLb -0,0006065 0,00019142 -3,168 
r=7.0868 
LinRes F(11,322) = 5.3039 [0.0000] ** 
t-prob HCSE 
0,1332 0,0077125 
° 
0,15144 
0,8108 0,11713 
0,1221 0,089518 
0,6407 0,0030123 
0,126 0,045605 
0,0005 5,0716E-05 
0,0032 0,00015868 
0,8898 0,0092375 
0,9833 8,9166E-05 
0,6462 0,00030057 
t-prob HCSE 
0,7901 0,0029495 
° 
0,12539 
0,0033 0,1175 
0,2074 0,068702 
0,0078 0,0026636 
0,8582 0,0092275 
0,1588 1,9829E-05 
0,0253 6,2738E-05 
0,0013 0,010602 
0,0076 4,2121E-05 
0,0017 0,00021882 
Spain 
EQ(M3) Modelling RP(SP) by OLS (using spa1.xls) 
The present sample is: 2 to 347 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-value t-prob HCSE 
Constant -0,013425 0,0044188 -3,038 0,0026 0,0044353 
RP1 0,63626 0,066503 9,567 0 0,099986 
Un(SP) 0,00021513 5,31 E-05 4,052 0,0001 1,73E-05 
fp(SP) 0,00023704 0,00011081 2,139 0,0331 7,63E-05 
Infl(GR) -0,013693 0,0080925 -1,692 0,0916 0,0056497 
Un(GR) 0,00011223 7,46E-05 1,504 0,1336 6,78E-05 
d(6.7782) 0,026065 0,0078211 3,333 0,001 0,012309 
dRP1 -0,0009118 0,084713 -0,011 0,9914 0,13018 
dUn(SP) 0,00012281 0,00014068 0,873 0,3833 0,00928905 
dfp(SP) -0,0006544 0,00023289 -2,81 0,0053 0,00038253 
dlnfl(GR) 0,032959 0,011459 2,876 0,0043 0,016635 
dUn(GR) -0,0007455 0,00033836 -2,203 0,0282 0,00059159 
RA2 = 0.658305 F(11 ,334) = 58.498 [0.0000] \sigma = 0.000555861 OW = 2.11 
RSS = 0.0001031998093 for 12 variables and 346 observations 
Information Criteria: 
SC = -14.8225 HQ = -14.9028 FPE=3.19698e-007 AIC = -14.9559 
AR 1- 2 F( 2,332) = 
ARCH 1 F( 1,332) = 
Normality ChiA2(2)= 
XiA2 F(21,312) = 
RESET F( 1,333) = 
1.5961 [0.2042] 
18.979 [0.0000] ** 
179.03 [0.0000] ** 
3.5684 [0.0000] ** 
5.5506 [0.0191] * 
Wald test for linear restrictions: Subset 
LinRes F( 6,334) = 5.5564 [0.0000] ** 
Zero restrictions on: 
d(6.7782) dRP1 dUn(SP) dfp(SP) dlnfl(GR) dUn(GR) 
2 regimes 
Regime a - for high German interest rate 
The present sample is:2 to 138 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-value 
Constant 0,01264 0,0092021 1,374 
RP1_a 0,63535 0,074827 8,491 
Un(SPLa 0,00033794 0,00018577 1,819 
fp(SPLa -0,0004173 0,0002921 -1,429 
Infl(GRLa 0,019266 0,01157 1,665 
Un(GRLa -0,0006333 0,0004706 -1,346 
Regime b - for low German interest rate 
The present sample is:139 to 347 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-value 
Constant -0,013425 0,0025504 -5,264 
RP1_b 0,63626 0,038384 16,576 
Un(SPLb 0,00021513 0,000030644 7,02 
fp(SPLb 0,00023704 0,000063955 3,706 
Infl(GRLb -0,013693 0,0046708 -2,932 
Un(GRLb 0,00011223 0,000043078 2,605 
r=6.7782 
LinRes F( 6,334) = 5.5564 [0.0000] ** 
t-prob HCSE 
0,1719 0,011537 
0 0,083768 
0,0712 0,00027984 
0,1555 0,00037662 
0,0983 0,015721 
0,1807 0,00059048 
t-prob HCSE 
0 0,0044217 
0 0,099679 
0 0,00007709 
0,0003 7,6065E-05 
0,0038 0,0056323 
0,0099 6,7592E-05 
Table 4.4 List of Variables 
RP = 
d(r) = 
r= 
dx = 
Infl = 
liP = 
DIIP = 
Un = 
xA= 
x(yy) = 
yy= 
r 
default risk premium 
indicator function for the German rate> or = r 
Threshold value for the German rate 
variable x multiplied by the indicator function 
inflation rate 
industrial production index 
change in the industrial production index 
unemployment rate 
announcement effect for variable x 
variable x relative to country yy 
BE (Belgium), IT (Italy), SP (Spain), GR (Germany) 
